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ABSTRACT 
 
Uncontrolled fluid flow in the wellbore is one of the most critical safety concerns 
for the oil and gas industry. The major focus of this dissertation is on blowout events 
given the most severe consequences associated with such incidents. The past tragedies 
reflect a strong need for not only understanding the mechanisms of blowout to accurately 
estimate the consequence, but also the approaches to managing and controlling the risks, 
uncertainties, and hazards associated with blowout events. 
A fully integrated analytical model that couples the reservoir and wellbore has 
been proposed to investigate the fluid behaviors during the blowout events. This model 
could be used to simulate any potential blowout events for gas, oil, or oil/gas wells at 
onshore or offshore facilities. The reservoir, wellbore, and their interactions are coupled 
together to demonstrate a full picture of the potential well blowout incidents. The results 
reveal that understanding the importance of heat transfer and multi-phase flow behaviors 
is essential to accurately estimate the consequence of well blowouts. Well-established 
computational algorithms are developed to effectively estimate the blowout rate and total 
discharge amount during blowout incidents. The statistical analysis identifies the 
independent variables responsible for the maximum discharge; both reservoir 
permeability and the connected reservoir volume are the key variables.  
The results of the blowout modeling could serve as the input for both 
consequence-based and risk-based approaches to assess the risk associated with the 
blowout events. The application of such approaches is demonstrated by the case study. 
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The consequence-based approach is easier to be implemented and provide guidance to 
the operators based on the realistic worst-case scenario. It would be useful for drilling 
site location selection and preparation of emergency response plan. On the other hand, 
the risk-based approach enables the operators to have a comprehensive understanding of 
the particular well that they are working on, so that the risk associated with the blowout 
events can be effectively managed and controlled. The risk reduction plan based on the 
blowout risk assessment is also discussed in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Uncontrolled fluid flow phenomena and the causes behind such flow must be 
understood in depth in order to improve safety performance in offshore operations. 
Anecdotal and statistical summaries of uncontrolled fluid flow phenomenon are 
discussed in the following sections. Also, a description of safety barriers to prevent 
uncontrolled fluid flow is discussed. 
 
1.1 Uncontrolled Fluid Flow 
1.1.1 Incident History 
Uncontrolled fluid flow in the wellbore is one of the most critical safety concerns 
for the oil and gas industry. It can result from petroleum seepage, hydrate formation, 
gas-kicks, and blowouts. Petroleum seepage takes place when the seal above the 
reservoir is breached. The hydrocarbon escapes along the fractures due to the buoyancy 
forces to the surface of the earth. Hydrates are solid mixtures of gas and water forming 
under low temperature and high pressure. It may happen in offshore wells as the ocean 
water temperature is low. The hydrates can block the subsea equipment, resulting in 
costly delays or even some dangerous scenarios, such as sudden release of gas at the 
surface. In a variety of operational phases, if the wellbore pressure provided by drilling 
mud is less than the formation pressure, the formation fluid will flow into wells from the 
reservoir. This is known as kicks, and is described in many references (Bourgoyne, 
1991). The rate of fluid influx is a function of reservoir parameters and the pressure 
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difference between the formation and wellbore. There are several indicators of kicks, 
including (Grace, 2003): 
 Sudden change in drilling rate 
 Increase in flow rate 
 Change in pump pressure 
 Reduction in drillpipe weight 
 Gas, oil or water-cut mud 
After detecting a kick, proper well control procedures must be performed 
immediately to eliminate the fluid influx and prevent further formation fluid from 
flowing into the well. The wellbore must be isolated from the surface by activating 
blowout preventers (BOP). Then the remaining fluid influx is circulated out to the 
surface. Once the influx has been displaced, heavier drilling mud is pumped into the well 
in order to regain control of the well. However, as can be seen from the past incident 
history of the oil and gas industry, such procedures do not always succeed. If the kick is 
out of control, it will lead to a blowout. 
The definition of blowout event according to International Association of Oil & 
Gas Producers (OGP) is an incident where formation fluid flows out of the well or 
between the formation layers after all the predefined technical well barriers or the 
activation of the same have failed (OGP, 2010). Although the drilling and production 
well planning may be good, the measurement and detection systems used are 
sophisticated and accurate, and personnel receive comprehensive training, blowout 
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events can still occur and lead to severe consequences, such as the deepwater Macondo 
incident in the US Gulf of Mexico. These consequences include: 
 Fatalities and injuries of personnel 
 Fire, explosion, or toxic hazard 
 Environmental impact 
 Loss of production 
 Loss of equipment 
 Blowout control cost 
 Loss of company credibility 
 Penalties and fines due to oil spill 
 Lawsuits and settlements 
In this dissertation, the research focuses on the blowout event given the most 
severe consequences associated with such incidents. Blowouts have occurred since the 
later 19th and early 20th centuries, and was called gusher – an icon of oil exploration. 
With more and more workmen being killed or losing hearing permanently because of the 
gusher, and the extremely severe damage to the wildlife, people started to be aware that 
gushers were hazardous events, triggering the invention and application of BOPs. 
However, even with the advent of BOPs, a number of notable incidents have occurred 
since then all over the world. In this dissertation, several incidents are described to 
demonstrate the severity of the blowout incidents and the necessity to focus on the 
blowout risk. 
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Gulf War Oil Spill 
The Gulf War oil spill in 1991 is known as one of the largest oil spills in history. 
When the Iraqi military retreated from Kuwait, over six hundred oil wells were set on 
fire in January 1991 to achieve the strategic goal—prevent potential landings of US 
Marines. The oil fire turned day into night due to the smoke. The fire lasted for about ten 
months. Until November 6, 1991, all blown-out oil wells due to the Gulf War were 
officially shut down (Grace, 2003). There were 11 fatalities associated with the Kuwait 
fires by that time. The oil spill left over 200 oil lakes throughout the desert, and some of 
them were more than six feet deep. The cleanup work is continuing until today.  
Different parties conducted research to estimate the volume of oil spilled during 
the Gulf War. Initially, media estimated the spilled amount could reach about 11 million 
US barrels (Landrey, 1991). After all the wells were shut in, the US Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries reported to the US Congress that the volume of the oil 
spill ranged between four and six million barrels (US Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries, 1992). The methods adopted in the above two estimations are not clear. In 
1993, Khordagui and Al-Ajmi (1993) reported that the maximum amount of spilled oil 
should be around two to four million barrels based on the historical and incident data. 
  
Kaixin Blowout Incident 
The incident happened on December 23, 2003 in Chongqing, China when the 
Luojia 16H well was being drilled by Chuandong Drilling Company. The production in 
that reservoir contained 82% methane, 9% hydrogen sulfide and 7% carbon dioxide (Xu, 
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2005). The blowout affected several villages that were only 300 to 500 m away from the 
well, and resulted in 243 fatalities, 1,242 hospitalizations, and over 65,000 evacuations 
(Li, 2009). The immediate causes for this tragedy include insufficient circulation time of 
drilling fluid during the pulling up operation, poor operating procedure compliance, 
missing back-pressure valve, malfunction of BOP, lack of hydrogen sulfide detectors, 
and poor emergency response planing. For example, igniting the production at the 
wellhead immediately when the sour gas well is out of control is considered as a typical 
industrial practice. However, in this incident, it took more than 13 hours to grant the 
permission for igniting. This incident also indicates the importance of conducting a 
consequence analysis and risk assessment to determine the minimum safety distance to 
the surrounding communities. 
 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill is considered as the most severe marine oil spill 
incident in the history. The incident led to 11 fatalities, 17 injuries and serious 
environmental damage (CSB, 2014). The loss of well control event quickly turned into a 
surface blowout of hydrocarbon gas and liquid. The hydrocarbon gas was ignited on the 
platform, resulting in a fire and explosion. The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig was 
severely damaged and finally sank. During the incident, the BOP failed to prevent a kick 
event from escalating to the blowout event. The attempt to completely seal the well by 
the blind shear ram was not successful due to the off-center drill pipe. In addition, the 
platform personnel also made several questionable decisions, such as the failure in 
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interpreting negative pressure test, and diverting the overflow to the mud-gas separators 
instead of directly overboard. There have been a number of reports discussing the 
technical causes and root causes of the incident. However, until today, an accurate 
estimate of the total discharge amount of the hydrocarbons has not been reported yet 
given the various uncertainties during this incident. Before drilling the Macondo well, 
BP estimated that the worst-case scenario of the oil discharge during a blowout event 
would reach 162,000 bbls (BP, 2009). After the incident, the US Coast Guard and BP 
initially estimated the blowout rate at about 1,000 bbl/day (Goldenberg, 2010). This 
number kept increasing and the Federal District Court judge finally ruled that the total 
amount spilled was 3.19 million barrels. The basis of such ruling is that there was about 
4 million barrels of oil discharged into the ocean and 810,000 barrels recovered (BP, 
2015). This tragedy reflects the strong need of not only understanding the mechanisms 
of blowout to accurately estimate the blowout consequence, but also the approaches to 
managing and controlling the risks, uncertainties, and hazards associated with deepwater 
drilling activities. 
 
1.1.2 Historical Statistics 
Blowout events could happen at either onshore or offshore operations. The major 
concerns for onshore well blowouts include the toxic gas dispersion, fire, and explosion 
that could potentially affect the onsite personnel and offsite communities. All the 
concerns of onshore well blowouts stay valid for offshore blowout events. One 
additional hazard scenario is the environmental impact due to offshore oil spill. The 
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most widely known blowout database is SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database. This 
database was initiated in 1984 with 18 participants from both operators and service 
providers. It provides category and location, well description, operations, blowout 
causes, blowout characteristics, and other useful information of total 607 offshore 
blowout and well release events from 1950 to present. The SINTEF Offshore Blowout 
Database is believed to cover most blowout incidents in the North Sea and the US Gulf 
of Mexico (GOM). It should be noted that the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE) also collects the GOM Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) loss of well 
control incidents, which have been an important information source for the SINTEF 
database. Besides SINTEF database, there are also other three databases documenting 
the onshore and offshore blowouts, including: 
 World Offshore Incident Databank (WOAD) 
 Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) database 
 Neal Adams Firefighters (NAF) database 
WOAD is currently under operation and maintenance of DNV GL. It has 
collected over 6,000 incidents data for various offshore facilities since 1970. It also 
contains the location and operation mode of around 3,700 offshore units. ERCB database 
is an open access database established by the Alberta Energy Regulator. Over 61,000 
onshore well and pipeline release events in Canada have been recorded since 1975. The 
NAF blowout database is not a public database. Many of the onshore blowouts in the 
NAF database come from the ERCB database with additional blowout data from Texas 
and Louisiana (Holland, 1997). 
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The value of the historical database is to provide information to enable us to 
understand the nature of the blowout events. Such statistical data often is associated with 
different operational phases. Consequently, the taxonomy of the main operations phases 
is presented as following: 
 Exploration drilling is an activity to explore potential hydrocarbon 
productions in the reservoir or determine the size of the reservoir with 
relatively limited knowledge to the geological information. 
 Development drilling is an activity to drill a production or injection well 
for the further development with relatively abundant knowledge about the 
geological information. 
 Completion is an activity conducted after the drilling is completed to 
prepare the well for the purpose of production or injection. Various types 
of equipment are run into the well that might disable the safety barriers 
for a certain period. 
 Workover is a well maintenance operation to solve the technical or 
production well issues. Similar to completion, equipment is run into the 
well that might disable the safety barriers for a certain period. 
 Production is an activity to extract hydrocarbon production from the 
reservoir to the surface. 
 Wireline is an activity to run the equipment into the well by a wireline 
through the tubing for the maintenance purposes. This operation will 
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disable the surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV), which is 
an important barrier to prevent blowout from happening. 
Table 1 (SINTEF 2013) shows the number of blowouts during different 
operational phases from January 1980 to December 2013 in the GOM, the North Sea 
(Norwegian and UK waters), and other parts of the world based on the SINTEF Offshore 
Blowout Database. It reveals that almost two thirds of blowouts occurred during drilling 
operations. Additional 17% of the incidents occurred during workover, which ranks the 
most complicated and difficult types of well operations. The blowout incidents during 
the production accounted for another 12%. Therefore, blowout events during drilling 
require critical attentions. 
 
Table 1. Offshore blowout/well release statistics between 1980 and 2011 (SINTEF, 
2013) 
Operations US GOM UK & Norway Rest of World Total 
Drilling 108 43 96 247 
Completion 13 7 6 26 
Workover 41 9 18 68 
Production 21 3 24 48 
Wireline 5 4 0 9 
Unknown 2 0 0 2 
Total 190 66 144 400 
 
It is also important to understand the nature of the discharge material during the 
well blowout events. As can be seen in Figure 1, gas is the most common blowout fluid. 
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A pure liquid blowout is rare because the oil usually contains a significant amount of gas 
in most of the reservoirs. Skalle et al. (1999) also conducted a statistical analysis on a 
database that contains about 1,120 blowout events at the GOM from 1960 to 1996. The 
trend of such analysis shows an agreement with the SINTEF database (Figure 2). Gas 
becomes the most common discharge materials during the blowout events. It can be 
concluded from the statistical analysis that the discharge materials of gas or liquid/gas 
should be focused when modeling the blowout events. 
 
 
Figure 1. Blowout flow medium for US GOM and North Sea between 1980 and 
2011 (SINTEF, 2013) 
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Figure 2. Blowout flow medium for US GOM from 1960 to 1996 (Skalle, 1999) 
 
Blowout duration is also an important characteristic when analyzing blowout 
events. It can be obtained from the statistical analysis. The blowout durations depend on 
a number of factors, such as the location of wells (onshore or offshore), the depth of 
wells, the existence of fires and explosions, the availability of crews and equipment, 
blowout severity, intervention plans, and blowout control techniques. Skalle et al. (1999) 
indicated that blowout duration could range from 0 to 450 days. Figure 3 shows the 
duration distribution for investigated blowouts. Forty-six percent of the blowouts were 
brought under control in less than one day. More than 22% of the blowouts could not be 
controlled within 3 days. They also showed that the average duration of blowouts for the 
well depth greater than 10,000 ft is 519.6 hours. Figure 4 shows the duration of blowouts 
based on SINTEF database (SINTEF, 2013). It is concluded that 25% of the blowouts 
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can be controlled in 12 hours, 69% of the blowouts lasted for at most five days, and 31% 
continued flowing for more than five days. 
The historical data suggests that the duration of blowouts ranges from hours to 
months and depends on many internal and external factors. The production loss, which 
determines the amount of oil spill, increases as the blowout continues. Therefore, long 
duration blowout incidents constituted the main focus of investigation in this 
dissertation. 
 
 
Figure 3. Blowout duration for US GOM blowouts from 1960 to 1996 (Skalle, 1999) 
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Figure 4. Blowout duration for US GOM and North Sea between 1980 and 2011 
(SINTEF, 2013) 
 
1.1.3 Safety Barriers 
 Safety barriers in the well are used to prevent hydrocarbon flows from the 
reservoir to flowing to the surface. NORSOK D010 (NORSOK, 2004) establishes the 
standards to the well barriers including:  
 Two independent well barriers shall be available during all well activities and 
operations to prevent uncontrolled outflow from the well to the external 
environment. 
 The two barriers shall be designed and selected to withstand the maximum 
anticipated differential pressure and environment exposure over time, and 
verified by leak test and function test. 
 No single failure of the well barriers shall lead to the uncontrolled outflow from 
the well to the external environment. 
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 The physical location and integrity status shall be known and monitored all the 
time. 
The two independent barriers include the primary and secondary barriers. The 
primary barrier usually refers to the hydrostatic pressure provided by the drilling mud, 
and the secondary barrier could include a variety of equipment, such as the BOP, 
wellhead, casing, tubing, and drilling string safety valve. Such barriers can also be 
grouped according to the functionality, how they are operated and how barrier failures 
are observed (Holland, 1997). Table 2 (Holland, 1997) shows some typical well barriers 
and the corresponding types. Figure 5 is an example demonstrating how the primary and 
secondary barriers are arranged during the drilling operation. 
 
Table 2. Some typical well barriers (Holland, 1997) 
Barrier Type Description Example 
Operational barrier 
A barrier that functions while the operation 
is carried out. A barrier failure will be 
observed when it occurs. 
Drilling mud 
Active barrier 
An external action is required to activate the 
barrier. Barrier failures are normally 
observed during regular testing. 
BOP, 
Christmas tree, 
SCSSV 
Passive barrier 
A barrier in place that functions 
continuously without any external action. 
Casing, tubing, 
well packer 
Conditional barrier 
A barrier that is either not always in place 
or not always capable of functioning as a 
barrier 
Stabbing valve 
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Figure 5. Example of barriers arrangement during drilling operation 
 
Similar to NORSOK D-010, American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended 
Practice (RP) 96 (API, 2013) requires a system of multiple physical barriers to be 
installed to prevent flow from formations from taking undesired paths (either to the 
surface or within the well). In addition, operational barriers are also considered in this 
RP, including human recognition and response, and institutional controls (e.g., casing 
design standards and policy manuals), to provide assurance that any failure of a physical 
barrier is detected early and managed without loss of well control. Moreover, it 
emphasizes that review of the barrier plan as part of a management of change (MOC) 
process shall be conducted if well conditions change. If a physical barrier is found to be 
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deficient during the operations and cannot be repaired, replacing such barrier or 
providing additional barriers, as a part of MOC should be considered.  
A UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) standard (HSE SPC/TECH/GEN/42) 
requires that the well completion operations should incorporate at least two barriers to 
flow between the reservoir and surface. UK requirements are less specific to the well 
barriers than the Norway and US regulations and standards (Holland, 1997). 
 
 1.2 Current Research and Practices to Address Blowout Events 
1.2.1 Current Research 
To properly assess and manage the blowout risk, past research mainly focused on 
the consequence modeling of blowout events at different conditions. Unfortunately, only 
a few papers have addressed the physical phenomenon of the blowout events. Clark and 
Perkins (1981) are perhaps the first researchers who presented a pioneering work to 
calculate the critical flow velocity, pressure, and temperature at the exit of an oil well 
blow-out. Hasan et al. (2000) also investigated the wellbore dynamics for an oil well 
blowout. In 1996, a method for blowout rate prediction for sour gas wells was presented 
by Kikani et al. (1996). Oudeman and his colleagues (Oudeman, 1998, Oudeman 2006, 
and Oudeman, 2010) accomplished a series of work focusing on simulating blowouts 
based on observations, such as wellhead pressure and temperature, plume shape and size, 
noise field around the wellhead, the pressure response of nearby wells, and production 
data of the wells with high flow rates, to develop proper well control strategies. Blowout 
events are dependent on not only the wellbore configurations, but also the reservoir 
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conditions. In addition, the interaction between the wellbore and the reservoir must be 
taken into consideration. However, none of the prior works mentioned earlier covered all 
these important components. Liu and others (2015) coupled the wellbore dynamics with 
a reservoir model to estimate blowout rate and the total discharge amount in an onshore 
gas well blowout for the first time. Such method, with extensive modification, can be 
adopted for the determination of offshore well blowout consequences.   
 
1.2.2 Consequence-based Assessment 
Due to the aftermath of the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, and 
the personnel injuries and fatalities, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) (formerly known as Minerals Management 
Service (MMS)) started requiring additional information for the operators’ planned 
activities (BOEMRE, 2014). Therefore, the consequence-based assessment for blowout 
events is required in the US GOM region at present, which is known as worst-case 
discharge (WCD) calculation. According to 30 CFR 250.213(g), the definition to the 
blowout scenario for an Exploration Plan (EP) is: 
―A scenario for the potential blowout of the proposed well in your EP that you 
expect will have the highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons. Include the estimated flow 
rate, total volume, and maximum duration of the potential blowout. Also, discuss the 
potential for the well to bridge over, the likelihood for surface intervention to stop the 
blowout, the availability of a rig to drill a relief well, and rig package constraints. 
Estimate the time it would take to drill a relief well.” 
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30 CFR 250.243(h) has the same requirement for a Development and Production 
Plan (DPP) and a Development and Coordination Document (DOCD). Such plans must 
be submitted to BOEM with a blowout scenario and worst-case discharge scenario.  
The worst-case discharge scenario determination is governed by two important 
factors – daily blowout rate and blowout duration. The requirements of the evaluation of 
the daily blowout rate are slightly different for exploratory or development drilling 
operations and production activities. For exploratory or development drilling operations, 
the daily discharge rate is the greatest potential daily discharge from an uncontrolled 
blowout through an open borehole (BOEMRE, 2010), considering any known reservoir 
characteristics and any analog reservoir characteristics from the area if they are 
unknown. For production activities, the determination of the daily discharge rate must 
take reservoir characteristics, casing/production tubing sizes, and historical production 
and reservoir pressure data into account according to 30 CFR 254.47(a)(3).  
The uncontrolled flow rate is obtained by using nodal-analysis, which is a 
standard petroleum engineering analysis tool (SPE, 2015). In such analysis, the inflow 
and tubing performance curves are plotted and the intersection of the two curves is 
considered as the discharge rate. The inflow performance curve is the mathematical 
model describing the pressure drop when the fluid flows from the reservoir to the 
wellbore through the porous medium. The model predicts the well bottomhole pressure 
at various flow rates considering a number of reservoir parameters and a given reservoir 
pressure. The tubing performance curve calculates the pressure drop when the fluid 
flows through the wellbore at constant wellhead pressure by taking the wellbore 
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characteristics into account. The purpose of nodal-analysis is to find the intersection of 
these two curves which determines the flow rate and pressure solution. Figure 6 shows 
an example of how the worst-case discharge rate is obtained from inflow and tubing 
performance curves. 
 
 
Figure 6. Example of inflow and tubing performance curves crossplot 
 
Operators must use the maximum duration of the potential blowout to evaluate 
the WCD. The maximum duration is the summation of the time it would take to contract 
for a rig, move it onsite, and drill a relief well, including the possibility of drilling a 
relief well from a neighboring platform or an onshore location (BOEMRE, 2014). 
Combining the daily discharge rate and the maximum duration of a potential blowout 
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scenario yields the WCD value. Figure 7 shows a typical work flow diagram for the 
determination of WCD scenario. 
 
 
Figure 7. Typical workflow for WCD assessment 
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1.2.3 Risk-based Assessment 
In the North Sea, the regulations require operators to determine the blowout risks 
duration during drilling, workover, intervention, and production operations. The major 
inputs for risk analysis are the frequency of blowout and release scenarios including 
release rate, duration, dispersion, and other factors (NORSOK, 2001). The blowout risk 
analysis covers the following components (NORSOK, 2001): 
 Probability of blowout and its consequence 
 Probability of occupational incidents and their consequence 
 Probability of different amount of oil spilled, as input to the 
environmental risk analysis 
Several reports investigating the environmental risk assessment of drilling 
activities are available in public domain (DNV, 2010 and ACONA, 2011). Such reports 
have served as the industrial benchmark for the risk-based assessment to the blowout 
events in the North Sea region. The first step of blowout risk assessment is to construct 
the statistical modeling of the blowout scenarios. The blowout scenarios are defined 
based on the flow path, blowout duration, penetration depth, and BOP status.  
The three flow paths include fluid flowing through open hole, drill pipe and 
annulus with different probabilities illustrated by Figure 8. A blowout could be killed by 
a number of reasons, including: 
 Bridging (self-killing due to collapse of formation near wellbore) 
 Crew intervention 
 Mechanical barriers (e.g., capping) 
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 Drilling of relief wells 
 Other causes 
Literature reveals that about 84% of the past blowout events are stopped by 
bridging (Scandpower, 2011). It serves as the major reason for the well being killed. The 
bridging may result from the accumulation of sand or rock inside the wellbore, collapse 
owing to the high flow rate and significant pressure difference between the reservoir and 
bottomhole, and the hydrate formation. Crew intervention includes the activities 
performed by onboard personnel to the existing equipment on the offshore installation, 
such as repair, and replacement components and equipment. Mechanical barrier such as 
capping has drawn significant attentions after the Macondo Blowout. The adoption of 
mechanical barrier to stop the blowout requires the successful activation of disconnect 
function at the subsea BOP system. The capping device then could be lowered onto the 
blowing well and closed upon the successful landing and connection to stop the blowout. 
Typically, the delivery of the capping device to the offshore installation could take 10 
days, and 5 to 15 days could be required to connect the device with the well depending 
on the weather, sea water depth and the well configuration (ACONA, 2012). When a 
blowout incident is confirmed, the plan of drilling relief well(s) needs to be discussed 
immediately. If all the above mentioned methods fail to stop the incident, relief well(s) 
will become necessary to regain the well control. The basic principle to drill a relief well 
is similar to drill an exploration well, except that the electromagnetic tools are required 
to ensure the precise interception with the blowing well. The blowing well could also be 
killed for other reasons, such as the reservoir pressure depletion, water injection, and 
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water breakthrough. All the approaches to kill the blowing well have possibilities to fail 
to regain the well control. Based on the SINTEF database, Figure 9 presents the 
probability that a blowing well is still flowing after the single intervention approach 
being applied, such as natural bridging, crew intervention, capping, and drilling relief 
well (ACONA, 2012 and Scandpower, 2011). The probabilities of blowout flow paths 
and blowout duration could be found from SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database, which 
is discussed in later section.  
 
 
Figure 8. Possible flow paths for blowout scenarios (from left to right: open hole, 
drill pipe and annulus) 
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Figure 9. Reliability plots for each of possible remedial actions 
 
When the drill bit reaches the reservoir, the hydrocarbons have the potential to 
form a blowout incident. The penetration depth to the reservoir is an important factor to 
determine the blowout rate. The typical industrial practice is to assume two penetration 
depths when assessing the blowout risk – partial penetration and fully penetration (DNV, 
2011 and ACONA 2012). The probability of partial penetration is assumed to be 0.6 and 
0.4 for fully penetration scenario when drilling exploration and development wells. 
BOP, as a secondary well barrier, has to fail or partially fail when the blowout occurs. 
OLF guidelines for estimation of blowout potential (OLF, 2004) suggest that BOP 
partial failure scenario would stand up 70% of the total blowout scenario, while the other 
30% presents the total BOP failure scenarios. When all these uncertainties are combined 
together, a statistical model of blowout scenario could be established. 
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Another important component of the blowout risk assessment is the consequence 
analysis for blowout events. The blowout rate determination is similar to the WCD 
calculation. The inflow and tubing performance curves are plotted together and the 
intersection of two curves indicates the blowout rate. It should be noted that the value of 
blowout rate is different for each blowout scenario, taking the well configuration, 
blowout duration, BOP status, penetration depth, and flow paths into account. Given the 
blowout duration is a part of the blowout risk assessment, the change in flow rate must 
be properly addressed. Hence, OLF guideline (OLF, 2004) suggests two approaches. The 
first is to assume that the blowout rate is constant over a certain period of time. The 
inflow performance curve is then re-plotted based on the pressure depletion given the 
production loss. The new intersection between the inflow and tubing performance curve 
defines a new blowout rate. Such procedure is performed repeatedly until the end of the 
blowout event. As can be seen from Figure 10, very limited number of the blowout rates 
is identified with the uncertainties discussed above due to the lack of integrated tools to 
model both reservoir and wellbore. An alternative approach can be based on a simplified 
model, assuming the constant blowout rate over the entire duration of the blowout event 
with the uncertainties distribution (Figure 11). Although the second approach yields 
overestimation to the blowout risk, it is generally accepted by the industry at present due 
to the technology limitation to determine the dynamic blowout rates. 
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Figure 10. Example of flow rate change during blowout event 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Example of constant flow rate during blowout event 
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When the blowout rate and probability are combined for each of the blowout 
scenarios, the total blowout risk picture could be depicted as shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. Example on blowout risk assessment results 
 
1.3 Statement of Problems and Significance 
1.3.1 Research Motivation 
As can be seen from the historical data, blowout events have caused many deadly 
incidents with a number of fatalities, asset loss, and severe environment impact for more 
than one century. However, the total amount of discharge is still an argument for most of 
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the incidents due to the technology limitation. At present, both the consequence-based 
assessment approach and the risk-based assessment approach have drawbacks.  
Requirements of reporting single value of WCD do not provide any additional 
values to manage the risk of the uncontrolled wellbore flow event and the impact to the 
marine environment. More importantly, it would be completely inadequate to represent 
the risk and mislead the risk picture to the general public.  
The risk-based approach depicts the blowout risk by using the constant blowout 
rate for most of the studies. However, Liu (2015) showed that the reservoir pressure 
depletion was a dominating factor for the exponential decrease in blowout rate, and 
illustrated the overestimation of blowout event consequence/risk if a constant value of 
blowout rate is assumed during the event. In addition, only uncertainties, such as flow 
path, which are available in the historical database, are considered in current studies. 
During the well planning phase, the reservoir characteristics may not be fully known. It 
is important to be aware that the reservoir parameters could be different even for wells in 
the same field. As a result, introducing the well-specific uncertainties associated with the 
reservoir will enable us to estimate the blowout risk more precisely.  
Moreover, most of the studies now are focusing on the offshore oil/gas well 
blowout events. However, the onshore gas well blowout could also impose great threat 
to the onsite personnel and offsite communities, as illustrated by the Kaixin incident. 
Therefore, a comprehensive methodology to fully assess the risks associated with 
various kinds of blowout events is needed, and such approach could serve as a 
benchmark for the industrial application. 
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1.3.2 Research Objectives 
In view of the above discussion, the primary objective of the proposed research is 
the advancement of understanding the onshore/offshore gas or oil/gas blowout 
mechanism. To capture all the physical phenomena during a blowout event, blowouts 
need to be simulated from the beginning of the event to the time they are brought under 
control. An analytical model of blowouts needs to be established taking into account the 
mass balance in the reservoir, and energy balance, momentum balance, and mass balance 
in the wellbore. The interaction between the reservoir and the wellbore will be also 
described in this model. It is expected that the model could estimate the blowout rates as 
a function of time and corresponding volume of spill based on the parameters of the 
reservoir, the wellbore configuration, and other operational conditions. The uncertainties 
during the blowout events are investigated, including the characteristics of the event and 
the well-specific parameters.  
The ultimate objective of the research is to quantitatively assess the blowout risk 
for the wells not only in the planning phase but also in the operational phase. A well-
established blowout consequence model couples the nature of transient-fluid flow in the 
reservoir and the fluid and heat flows in the wellbore. Combining the consequence 
model and the uncertainties from both historical database and well-specific parameters 
provide great opportunities to understand and manage the blowout risk. In addition, this 
dissertation demonstrates how this method could be practically applied in typical 
industrial settings. The risk reduction plan is also discussed in the later sections using 
statistical and sensitivity analysis. 
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1.3.3 Research Methodology 
 To understand the risk associated with uncontrolled flow events, this research is 
divided into three parts – consequence modeling, uncertainties determination and 
assessing the risk associated with the blowout events. Figure 13 outlines the overall 
research plan. 
 
 
Figure 13. Proposed research outline 
 
Modeling of uncontrolled fluid flow in wellbore and 
its prevention 
Research Topic 
Understand physical mechanism of blowout  
Determine risk associated with blowout events 
Objectives 
Consequence modeling of 
onshore/offshore gas or oil/gas 
well blowout 
Part I 
 •  Wellbore 
 •  Reseroivr 
 •  Wellbore/Reservoir  
     Interaction 
Determine uncertainties during 
blowout events 
Part II 
Couple consequence and uncertainties 
to depict blowout risk and provide 
guidance to prevention and mitigation 
measurments 
Part III 
 •  Generial data 
 •  Well-Specific 
 31 
 
The consequence modeling is first established to couple the reservoir and 
wellbore. The reservoir pressure depletion, and fluid dynamics and heat transfer in the 
wellbore are taken into account. The results of the model are validated by the field data 
and existing models. 
The uncertainties associated with the blowout events are scrutinized. Combining 
the generic statistical data from database, probability distribution according to the 
guidelines, and well-specific uncertainties based on the geological test information 
yields a full spectrum of the potential blowout scenarios. 
Lastly, the consequence and uncertainties are coupled together for each of the 
scenarios to depict the blowout risk picture. Sensitivity and statistical analysis 
demonstrates the importance of the well barriers and provides guidance for the blowout 
prevention measurements and risk reduction plans. 
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CHAPTER II  
CONSEQUENCE MODELING OF GAS WELL BLOWOUT
1
 
 
 To estimate the total discharge amount of hydrocarbons during a blowout event, 
the blowout rate, which depends on the well configuration and the reservoir conditions, 
must be dynamically obtained throughout the entire event. The interaction between the 
reservoir and the wellbore also needs to be taken into account. The reservoir pressure 
determines if the blowout rate can be sustained, while the discharged hydrocarbon flow 
depletes the pressure of the reservoir. As a result, in this chapter, the reservoir model, the 
wellbore model and the interactions between the reservoir and wellbore are studied 
separately. Then they are coupled together to understand the blowout mechanism. In the 
reservoir model, we assume that the reservoir is isothermal during the blowout event. 
The heat transfer model is therefore not considered in the reservoir. For onshore gas well 
blowout, one of the major challenges is the sonic velocity at the wellhead. With the high 
reservoir pressure and ambient pressure at wellhead, hydrocarbon gas tends to be choked 
at the wellhead. The determination of sonic velocity requires the estimation of the 
pressure and temperature profile of the fluid along the wellbore. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from ―Flow rate and total discharge estimation in gas-
well blowouts‖ by Liu, R., Hasan, A. R. and Mannan, M. S. (2015). Journal of Natural Gas Science and 
Engineering, 26, 438-445. Copyright 2015 Elsevier. 
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2.1 Reservoir Model 
In this section, the behavior of the reservoir is studied. Given the duration of the 
blowout events, the extremely high flow rate at the wellhead depletes the reservoir. The 
depletion of a reservoir results in the decrease of reservoir pressure, and therefore leads 
to a decreased wellhead velocity. Thus, a material balance in the reservoir needs to be 
considered to calculate one of the most important variables that governs the blowout 
mechanism—average reservoir pressure. 
iG  and G  represent the initial and current gas-in-place within a drainage area of 
a reservoir. The cumulative production, pG  (production loss for the case of blowout), 
from a gas reservoir is calculated as:   
 
gi
p i i i
g
B
G G G G G
B
      (1) 
where giB  and gB  are initial and current gas formation volume factors, respectively. The 
gas formation volume factor relates the volume of 1 lb-mole of natural gas at reservoir 
conditions to its volume at standard conditions.  
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 By substituting 1scZ  , 520scT
 R, and 14.7scp  psi, the above equation becomes: 
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ZT
B
p
   (3) 
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If the reservoir is assumed to be isothermal, substituting Equation (3) into 
Equation (1) yields: 
 
/
(1 )
/
p i
i i
p Z
G G
p Z
    (4) 
Given some basic reservoir parameters, the original gas in place, iG , can be obtained by: 
 
g
i
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G
B

   (5) 
where A  is drainage area, h  is payzone thickness,   is porosity of the formation, and 
gs  is gas saturation. The importance of Equation (4) is that once the cumulative 
production/loss is known at any time t , the average reservoir pressure p , which strongly 
affects the blowout rate, can be calculated. However, the average reservoir pressure and 
compressibility factor cannot be obtained directly, thus an iterative modeling approach is 
needed to determine the correct average reservoir pressure. It is discussed in later 
sections. 
 
2.2 Wellbore Model 
2.2.1 Wellbore Dynamic Model for Single Phase Gas 
A gas well is inherently dangerous for any operation in the oil and gas industry. 
If an onshore gas well is out of control, a significant amount of gas will come out from 
the formation and into the atmosphere. The gas will diffuse to the surroundings, forming 
a mixture of air and hydrocarbon gases. Depending on the concentration, a single spark 
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could ignite this mixture and cause a huge explosion, resulting in personnel fatalities and 
injuries, and asset loss. In addition, the toxic content in the mixture cloud may put the 
onsite personnel and offsite populations into jeopardy illustrated by the Kaixian blowout 
incident. 
Single phase gas flow in the wellbore is one of the most fundamental problems in 
production engineering of the oil and gas industry. The importance of single phase flow 
in vertical or inclined wells has led to the development of a variety of models. The basis 
of these models is the mechanical momentum balance. Mechanical momentum balance 
represents the pressure drop along the flow path:   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )T F H A
dp dp dp dp
dz dz dz dz
    (6) 
Equation (6) shows the total pressure gradient, ( )T
dp
dz
, is the summation of the 
frictional gradient, ( )F
dp
dz
, the hydrostatic gradient, ( )H
dp
dz
, and the acceleration 
gradient, ( )A
dp
dz
. These three components of the total pressure drop are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
For the fluid flow model in a wellbore, it is assumed that the fluid flows through 
a symmetric well, and the pressure in the cross section plane normal to flow remains 
constant. With such assumptions, the fluid flow model reduces to one dimensional 
analysis, as shown in Figure 14.  
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Among the three components of the total pressure drop, the hydrostatic gradient 
is convenient to be estimated, as it only needs the input of gas density and well deviation 
angle.  
 ( ) sinH g
dp
g
dz
     (7) 
Because the density of gas obeys the Equation of State, the static term will vary along 
the well. 
 
 
Figure 14. Flow geometry for pipe flow 
 
The acceleration gradient is given by: 
 ( )
sg
A g sg
dvdp
v
dz dz
   (8) 
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One simplified assumption is that the tubing has constant cross section area. However, in 
the multiple casing of offshore setting, such assumption needs to be adjusted 
accordingly. The gas velocity, sgv , is a function of pressure and temperature. By chain 
rule, Equation (8) can be written as: 
 ( ) [( ) ( ) ]
sg sg
A g sg T p
v vdp dp dT
v
dz p dz T dz

 
  
 
  (9) 
From the Equation of State, we have: 
 
g
sg
q ZnR T
v
A A p
    (10) 
where gq  is volumetric flow rate and A  is the area of cross section of tubing. 
Differentiating of sgv  with respect to pressure and temperature yields:   
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Thus, Equation (9) becomes: 
 
2 2
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dz p dz T dz
 
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The frictional pressure gradient is represented by:   
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where f  is the Moody friction factor, depending on the turbulence of the fluid and the 
pipe roughness, and d  is tubing diameter. The friction factor is usually expressed as a 
function of the Reynolds number and roughness factor ( / d ). The roughness factor can 
be found in various references (Moody, 1944). Some charts are useful for all types of 
pipe roughness and Reynolds number. However, the implicit relationship between 
Moody friction factor and roughness factor is not easy to be implemented into the 
computational programs. Therefore, in this research, the following explicit expressions 
for the Moody friction factor calculation without the need of the iterative solution 
procedure is used (Chen, 1979):  
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where the dimensionless parameter   is given by:  
 0.8981
/ 7.149
( )
2.8257
d
Re
     (16) 
Combining Equations (7), (13) and (14), the total pressure gradient when gas flows 
through the wellbore can be expressed as: 
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Therefore,  
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The temperature gradient, 
dT
dz
, can be calculated from the analytic expression 
for steady flow in a wellbore, which is discussed in a later section. Alternatively, the 
temperature gradient term can be estimated with respect to the pressure gradient. It is 
especially suitable for blowout scenarios. For a gas well blowout, the velocity of gas is 
subsonic near the wellhead. Thus, the heat exchange between the gas and its 
surroundings (formation) is greatly reduced. It is reasonable to assume that the gas is 
experiencing adiabatic expansion near the wellhead. First, Equation (9) is changed into 
the following form by utilizing Equations (11) and (12):  
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Then, the total pressure gradient can be expressed as: 
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To calculate the term 
dT
dp
, we can assume that the gas near the wellhead is ideal 
given that the pressure near wellhead is approximately equal to the atmosphere due to 
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the high fluid velocity. Therefore, the following relationships are valid for an adiabatic 
process: 
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0 0
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where 0T  and 0p  are the temperature and pressure under standard conditions and pC  is 
heat capacity. Replacing 
dT
dp
 by Equation (22), Equation (20) becomes a first order 
Ordinary Differential Equation, which can be solved analytically. 
 
2.2.2 Heat Transfer 
Significant heat exchange between the wellbore fluid and its surroundings is 
inevitably involved during the fluid flowing through the well. For an offshore well 
where sea water is present, the situation is more complicated due to the cold marine 
temperature. During a blowout event, formation fluid with high temperature comes from 
the reservoir. As it moves upward, it loses heat to the surroundings. The temperature 
difference between the wellbore fluid and the formation increases as the fluid flows up 
from the bottomhole to the wellhead. This heat transfer process affects the fluid 
properties, and therefore influences the fluid dynamics in the wellbore. For multi-phase 
flow, the flow regime is also impacted. Thus, the momentum balance equations need to 
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be solved with energy balance equations simultaneously. In the following paragraphs, 
the formation temperature distribution in the radial direction is first addressed. Then the 
heat exchange between the wellbore fluid and its surroundings is taken into account by 
performing the energy balance for the wellbore fluid. Lastly, these equations are solved 
to get analytic solutions for hydrocarbon gas. 
When the hot wellbore fluid moves upward to the wellhead from the bottomhole, 
it provides a heat source to the formation. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the 
wellbore as a heat sink. Several assumptions need to be made to model the heat flow and 
the resulting temperature distribution in the formation suggested by the literature (Hasan, 
1994). The first assumption is that the formation is a homogeneous solid. In addition, 
assuming that the formation is symmetric around the well reduces the model from three 
dimensions to two dimensions. Moreover, due to the small temperature gradient in the 
vertical direction, the heat diffusion in the vertical direction is assumed to be negligible. 
Then an energy balance is derived in cylindrical coordinates as follows:  
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  (23) 
where eT  is formation temperature at time, t , and distance, r , measured from the center 
of the wellbore, ec , e , and, ek , represent heat capacity, density and thermal 
conductivity of the formation. One initial condition and two boundary conditions are 
needed to solve this partial differential equation. At initial time ( 0t  ), we assume that 
temperature is uniform throughout the formation horizontally, which leads to the 
following initial condition:  
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 ( , 0)e eiT r t T    (24) 
At a point very far away from the wellbore in the reservoir, the temperature 
gradient is zero. In addition, the heat exchange at the interface of the wellbore and 
formation must obey Fourier’s law of heat conduction. Therefore, two boundary 
conditions could be written as:  
 2 |
wb
e
e r r
r T
Q k
r
 



  (25) 
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  (26) 
where Q  is the heat flow rate from the formation to the well and wbr  is the radius of the 
wellbore. 
Equation (23) coupled with the initial condition (Equation (24)) and boundary 
conditions (Equations (25) and (26)) can be solved analytically by using Laplace 
transformations (Hasan, 1994 and Everdingen, 1949). The analytical solution of 
formation temperature is a function of radial distance and time:  
 
2wb ei
e
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T T I
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where,  
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In Equation (28), Dt  is defined as dimensionless time ( 2
e
D
e e wb
k t
t
c r
 ). The 
dimensionless temperature, DT , is defined as following:  
 
2
( )eD wb ei
k
T T T
Q

     (29) 
Evaluation of Equation (27) is computationally expensive because of the 
integration of modified Bessel functions of zero and first order. Hasan and Kabir (Hasan, 
1994) found the following algebraic expressions for the dimensionless temperature could 
represent the solutions without losing accuracy.  
 
0.2ln[ (1.5 0.3719 ) ]D Dt tD DT e e t
      (30) 
The temperature difference between the wellbore fluid and the surrounding 
formation is the driving force of energy exchange. Figure 15 shows the schematic of a 
typical well setting, based on which the energy balance of wellbore fluid is developed. In 
a control volume of length, dz , at a distance, z , from the wellhead, the energy balance 
is given by:   
 
2 2| ( ) sin | | sin |z dz z dz z zwH z dz wg wv Qdz wH wg wv           (31) 
where w  is mass flow rate of fluid and H  is fluid enthalpy. Changing Equation (31) 
into differential form yields:  
 sin
dH dv Q
g v
dz dz w
      (32) 
Enthalpy is a function of pressure and temperature, and is given by:  
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 ( ) ( )p T p J p
H H
dH dT dp c dT C c dp
T p
 
   
 
 (33) 
where JC  is the Joule-Thomson coefficient and pc  is the heat capacity of the fluid under 
constant pressure. By substituting Equation (33) into Equation (32), the wellbore fluid 
temperature as a function of depth can be expressed by:  
 
1
[ sin ]
f
J
p
dT dp Q dv
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dz dz c w dz
       (34) 
 
 
Figure 15. Energy balance for wellbore fluid 
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Combining Equations (29), (30), and (34), the expression of fluid temperature, 
fT , can be obtained. However, the temperature at wellbore/formation interface, wbT , 
cannot be easily measured. Therefore, an overall heat transfer coefficient for the 
wellbore is introduced to replace wbT . 
In typical wellbore configurations, there are tubing, tubing-casing annulus, 
casing and cement, as shown in Figure 16. They are considered as resistances that the 
radial heat transfer must overcome. During steady-state, the rate of heat flow through a 
wellbore Q  can be expressed as: 
  2 ( )to to f wbQ r U T T    (35) 
where toU  is the overall heat transfer coefficient. The rate of heat flow is determined by 
the overall heat transfer coefficient, the tubing outside surface area, and the temperature 
difference between the wellbore fluid and wellbore/formation interface. The heat flows 
through each of the elements from wellbore fluid to surrounding formations. Therefore, 
we can derive the expression for the overall heat transfer coefficient (Hasan, 1994):
  
ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / )1 1to to to ti to co ci to wb co
to ti to t c c cem
r r r r r r r r r r
U r h k h k k
      (36) 
where tir , tor , cir  and cor  are tubing inner radius, tubing outer radius, casing inner radius, 
and casing outer radius, and toh  and ch  represent convective heat transfer coefficients 
for tubing and annular fluid. 
In Equation (36), the resistances to heat transfer provided by annulus and tubing 
fluid need to be calculated as they cannot be directly measured in the field. The Sieder-
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Tate correlation is used for forced convective heat transfer coefficient calculation for 
turbulent flow in pipes and wells (McCabe, 2004):  
 
0.8 0.33 0.140.023( ) ( ) ( )
pto
w
ch d dv
Nu
k k
 
 
    (37) 
where w  is the viscosity of the fluid at the wall temperature. In fact, neglecting the last 
term will not introduce significant error unless the viscosity of the fluid is high. 
When a fluid is in contact with two parallel plates with different temperatures, 
both the heat conduction and natural convection will take place. The temperature 
difference between casing and tubing changes the density of fluid in the casing-tubing 
annulus. Consequently, it results in fluid circulation in the annulus, and enhances heat 
transfer. In this work, the correlation of the heat transfer coefficient for natural 
convection for the fluids between two vertical plates proposed by Dropkin and 
Sommerscales is adopted (Dropkin, 1965). The correlation for natural convection 
coefficient in a cylindrical coordinator is:  
 
0.333 0.0740.049( )
ln( / )
a
c
to ci to
GrPr Pr k
h
r r r
   (38) 
where Gr is the Grashof number and Pr is the Prandtl number. However, the evaluation 
of Grashof number requires the temperature difference between tubing and casing. 
Therefore, an iterative solution procedure is needed to obtain the natural convection 
coefficient. Then the overall heat transfer coefficient can be calculated. 
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Figure 16. Heat flow through a series of resistances 
 
Equation (29) is coupled with Equation (35) to replace wbT . The heat flow 
crossing the wellbore/formation interface can be expressed as:  
 ( )R p f eiQ L wc T T     (39) 
where the relaxation parameter, RL , is defined as (Hasan, 2012):  
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Substituting Equation (40) into Equation (34) yields: 
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 ( ) sin
f
J f ei R
dT dp dv
C T T L g v
dz dz dz
       (41) 
In Equation (41), eiT  is the initial formation temperature, varying with depth 
nearly linearly. Therefore, for an inclined well of true vertical depth L , it can be 
expressed as:  
 ( ) sinei eibh GT T L z g      (42) 
where eibhT  is initial bottomhole temperature that remains constant within the time and 
Gg  is the geothermal gradient. Then Equation (41) can be written as:  
 ( ) sin
f
f ei R
dT
T T L g
dz
        (43) 
where 
 
J
dv dp
v C
dz dz
     (44) 
Equation (43) is a first order linear differential equation, which can be solved 
analytically based on different scenarios. 
 For typical gas production, the term   is usually small and therefore negligible. 
However, considering the rapid expansion of gas near the wellhead and the resulting 
large pressure gradient, this term could be significant when evaluating the gas well 
blowout. 
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2.2.3 Sonic Velocity 
 The upper limit of the wellhead velocity is the sonic velocity of the hydrocarbon 
gas from the well during the blowout events. In the following paragraph, the explanation 
to the existence of this limit is given (Smith, 2005). From the continuity equation one 
can have: 
  0
vA dV dv dA
d
V V v A
     (45) 
When fluid flows through a constant cross section area (e.g., pipeline, wellbore), the last 
term is zero. Equation (45) reveals the relationship between the control volume V  and 
the fluid velocity v . The control volume of fluid is a function of entropy S  and pressure 
P  according to the thermodynamics laws. Therefore, it could be written as: 
 ( ) ( )p S
V V
dV dS dp
S P
 
 
 
  (46) 
The two terms on the right hand side can be expressed as:   
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2
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V V
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


  (47) 
and  
 ( ) p
p
V VT
S C



  (48) 
where c  is the speed of sound in a fluid and   is the volume expansion coefficient. 
Substituting Equation (47) and (48) into Equation (46) yields: 
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V C c

    (49) 
From the knowledge of thermodynamics, we also have: 
 TdS Vdp dH vdv      (50) 
Therefore, combining Equations (45), (49), and (50) by assuming constant cross section 
area, we have: 
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where the M is the Mach number, determined by the ratio of the velocity and sound 
speed in the fluid. A transformation of Equation (51) is: 
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 Fluid always flows towards the negative pressure gradient direction. Based on 
the second law of thermodynamics, the entropy always increases. Therefore, the value of 
M  cannot be larger than 1, indicating that the upper limit of the fluid speed must be the 
sonic velocity. The sonic velocity of gas is derived from thermodynamic knowledge of 
ideal gas behavior by Kieffer (1977), as 
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where   is the ratio of heat capacities ( /p vC C ), R  is the universal gas constant, and M  
is the molecular weight. 
 
2.3 Reservoir and Wellbore Interaction 
This section describes the reservoir variable that governs the blowout rate under 
different conditions. Given that a blowout event could happen during any operational 
phase, such as drilling, completion and production, the theory of reservoir and wellbore 
interaction is applicable to all these phases. When the formation fluid flows from the 
reservoir, a pressure disturbance is initiated at the location of the well. Such disturbance 
travels toward the boundaries of the reservoir within the time. However, for the point 
that is far away from the disturbance generation location, such disturbance cannot be 
detected immediately. The furthest distance where the effect can be monitored is called 
the radius of investigation 
invr . It is given by: 
 
inv
t
kt
r
c
   (54) 
where k  is reservoir permeability, t  is time,   is reservoir porosity,   is reservoir fluid 
viscosity, and 
tc  is total compressibility accounting for the compressibility of reservoir 
fluid and rock. When t  is small, it results in a minimum radius of investigation 
compared to the radius of the reservoir. This period is called transient period or infinite 
acting period. 
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2.3.1 Transient Period 
For most of the fluid that flows from the reservoir into the well, it should obey 
Darcy’s Law (Darcy, 1856). The expression of Darcy’s law in radial coordinates is: 
 r
kA dp
q
dr
  (55) 
where 
rA  is a radial area at a distance r . The following classic diffusivity equation can 
describe the pressure profile in the reservoir: 
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2
1 tcp p p
r r r k t
  
 
  
  (56) 
During the transient period, it is assumed that the well is a line source compared 
to the reservoir with large radius. The assumption leads to a general solution of Equation 
(56): 
 
2
( )
4 4
t
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c rqB
p p Ei
kh kt
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
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In Equation (57), q  represents the sandface flow rate, h  is formation thickness, and 
( )Ei x  is the exponential integral function. The following equations are derived from 
Equation (57) for the interaction between the gas reservoir and the gas well during the 
transient period: 
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T kh m p m p
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   (58) 
where  
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In Equation (58), ( )m p  is the pseudo pressure. The purpose of introducing the 
pseudo pressure is to eliminate the nonlinearity due to the equation of state for gases. 
The method of images (Matthews, 1954) is used in Equation (59) to connect the infinite 
acting period and pseudo steady-state period, which is discussed in later paragraphs. The 
summation of the exponential integral function accounts for the partial boundary effect. 
The coefficient   is a correction term to smooth the transition between the infinite 
acting flow and pseudo steady-state flow. Kabir (2006) suggested the value of   ranges 
between 1.1 and 1.3. As time progresses, the radius of investigation becomes larger and 
comparable to the radius of the reservoir, so that the well cannot be assumed to be a line 
source any more. Then the reservoir is in a pseudo steady-state period. 
 
2.3.2 Pseudo Steady-State Period 
Earlougher (1977) has shown that the time at which pseudo steady-state begins is 
given by: 
 
0.000264
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k

   (61) 
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In a pseudo steady-state period, pressure disturbance could be detected at all the 
boundaries of the reservoir. From the radial diffusivity equation, the pressure, 
ep , at the 
point of 
er r  in a reservoir with radius, er , can be expressed as:  
 
141.2
(ln 0.5)ee wf
w
rqB
p p
kh r

     (62) 
However, the value of 
ep  is immeasurable in the field. A more useful expression for 
pseudo steady-state flow is to use the average reservoir pressure that can be obtained 
based on Equation (4):  
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(ln )ewf
w
qB r
p p s Dq
kh r

     (63) 
where s  is skin factor and D  is the non-Darcy coefficient, which describes the 
condition of the wells (e.g., damage or stimulation). For a gas reservoir, the formation 
volume factor is defined by Equation (3) with average value. Therefore: 
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and from Equation (62) 
 
2 2 1424 (ln )ewf
w
rq ZT
p p s
kh r

    (65) 
To avoid the nonlinearity in Equation (65), Al-Hussainy et al. (Al-Hussainy, 
1966) suggests introducing pseudo pressure defined as follows: 
 
0
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Equation (65) therefore becomes: 
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2.3.3 Unified Model 
When modeling the blowout events, the transition from transient period to 
pseudo steady-state period is common given that the high blowout rate depletes the 
reservoir pressure quickly. However, combination of Equations (58) and (67) usually 
leads to the discontinuity between the transition and highly depends on the value of  . 
Therefore, a general solution (Matthews, 1967) that could cover both periods is adopted 
in this research: 
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and the na  values are the root of: 
 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0n eD n n n eDJ a r Y a J a Y a r    (71) 
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where 1J  is the Bessel function of first kind and 1Y  is Bessel function of second kind. 
The Equation (71) has infinite number of solutions. Figure 17 shows the solutions for 
Equation (71) from the interval between 0 to 0.1. With sufficient number of the roots, 
the pseudo pressure difference could be relatively easy to obtain, which is 
computationally inexpensive.  
 
 
Figure 17. Solutions of Equation (71) from 0 to 0.1 
  
 In addition, the summation term in Equation (68), as shown in Figure 18, is 
significant compared to other terms at early times. However, this term becomes less 
important as time progresses, thereby indicating that the transition between early and late 
time is occurring. At late times, the summation term becomes negligible. Stated 
differently, the pseudo pressure difference bears a linear relationship with flow rate 
during the pseudo steady-state flow period when the effects of all the boundaries have 
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been felt at the wellbore. The advantage of Equation (68) is that it avoids the 
discontinuity between the two flow periods of interest, transient and pseudo steady-state.  
 
 
Figure 18. Summation term in Equation (68) 
 
2.4 Computational Algorithm 
The onshore gas well blowout duration is divided into small segments first, then 
at each time step:  
1. Sonic velocity is assumed to exist, and the wellhead temperature is assumed to be 
ambient temperature. Then the flow rate in Mscf/D can be calculated. 
2. Use the flow rate to calculate the compressibility factor in the reservoir at current 
time step by Equation (4):   
a) Initial pressure and compressibility factor are known, the cumulative 
production can be obtained by examining the flow rate history. 
b) The term of /p Z  can be obtained readily. 
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c) Because the average reservoir pressure p  is unknown and compressibility 
factor Z  depends on the pressure, an iterative procedure is needed to 
calculate the compressibility factor. 
d) Convergence is reached and the compressibility factor at current time step is 
obtained. 
3. Use the flow rate in Step 2 to calculate the pseudo pressure difference. 
4. The bottomhole pressure is then calculated by Equation (66)   
5. Once the bottomhole pressure is known, a bottom-to-top calculation in wellbore 
could be performed so that the wellhead temperature and wellhead velocity can 
be calculated according to Equations (20) and (43). 
a) Use the flow rate in Step 1 to calculate the wellhead conditions, including 
pressure, temperature, and velocity. If the wellhead pressure is large than 
ambient pressure, go to Step 5 b); otherwise, go to Step 5 d) 
b) The blowout is in the wellhead pressure governed mode. Calculate the sonic 
velocity based on the computed wellhead temperature and compare with the 
computed wellhead velocity. If two values are not equal, go to Step 5 c); 
otherwise, go to Step 6.  
c) Use the new sonic velocity and computed wellhead temperature in Step 5 b) 
to repeat Step 1 to 5 b) until the convergence is reached. 
d) The blowout is in the reservoir pressure governed mode. Re-guess a new flow 
rate and repeat Step 1 to 5 a) until the wellhead pressure equals to the 
ambient pressure. Then go to Step 6. 
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6. Go to next time step. 
 
2.5 Results and Discussion 
 First, Equation (68) is compared with commercial software for the scenarios of 
the constant rate drawdown test in a gas reservoir. As shown in Figure 19, a good 
agreement with the results of a commercial package for the reservoir response is 
indicated. The early-time transient period is over around 10,000 hr, followed by late-
time, pseudo steady-state condition with a smooth transition. 
 
 
Figure 19. Constant rate drawdown test of gas reservoir 
 
We used the results of Oudeman (2010) to validate the blowout model first. 
These data were obtained from the results of well testing of a small tight offshore gas 
reservoir at the North Sea. This gas well was drilled underbalanced and a series of well 
tests were performed. This example presented a great opportunity to verify the blowout 
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model because of the high flow rates associated with testing. Different wellhead 
pressures during testing may be construed as blowouts at various water depths. Given 
the wellhead pressure and the reservoir pressure, it is possible to calculate the blowout 
rate and bottomhole pressure. Figure 20 shows the comparison of the calculated and 
measured rates. In general, the calculated rates match the measured rates fairly well. 
Poor flow stabilization in the reservoir probably contributed to the scatter in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20. Comparison of measured and calculated blowout rates by our blowout 
model (b) comparison of measured and calculated blowout rates from Oudeman 
(2010) 
 
Our model, discussed in the previous section, is applied to an onshore sour-gas 
well in Germany, as described by Kikani et al. (1996). The field data for this example is 
reported in Table 3. In this case, it should be noted that the flow is choked (sonic 
velocity is present) throughout the whole duration of the blowout. 
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Table 3. Data presented in the field example of Kikani et al. (1996) 
Parameters Value 
Well Depth, ft 12,300 
Reservoir Depth, ft 12,456 
Net Thickness, ft 100 
Porosity 0.149 
Water Saturation 0.15 
Reservoir Pressure, psia 5,985 
Reservoir Temperature, °F 276.8 
Gas Gravity 0.83 
H2S concentration 0.2869 
Tubing inner radius, ft 0.25 
Drainage radius, ft 3,280 
Skin -2.5 
Non-Darcy Coefficient, day/Mscf 2.57E-05 
Permeability, md 4.3 
 
Because Kikani et al. did not use a thermal model, we first matched their 
simulated blowout rates with our model allowing no temperature variation with time. 
The agreement of our model generated blowout rates with Kikani’s numerical model 
appears very good as shown in Figure 21. However, when heat transfer effects are 
accounted in our model, a divergence of about 5% in estimated rate with Kikani’s 
simulation is observed.  Figure 21also shows our computed wellhead fluid temperature 
on the secondary y-axis.  A wellhead fluid temperature increase of about 30 ºF over 100 
days of production is noted in Figure 21.  This temperature difference appears to be the 
primary reason for higher blowout rate calculated by our model in later times. 
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Figure 21. Comparison of model presented in this work and Kikani’s results 
 
Figure 22 shows the temperature profile in the wellbore when choked flow rate is 
achieved at the wellhead. Two interesting phenomena are observed from this figure. 
First, the fluid temperature starts to decrease as it moves up from the bottomhole and 
quickly declines near the wellhead. Second, the wellhead temperature increases over 
time, although the blowout rate may decline during the blowout event because of 
reservoir depletion. These observations can be explained by examining Equations (43) 
and (44). There are two important components that are taken into account in heat transfer 
equations, which are kinetic energy loss (KE) and Joule-Thomson Effect (JT); Equation 
(44) combines these two components.  
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Figure 22. Fluid temperature in wellbore during a blowout event 
 
Figure 23 shows these two components affecting the behavior of heat transfer in 
blowout events for a given situation with and without considerations of KE and/or JT 
near the wellhead. The contributions of KE and JT are significant when the fluid 
approaches to wellhead. The figure illustrates the fluid temperature profile in the 
wellbore starting from 20 feet below the wellhead for four cases—with JT and KE, with 
JT and without KE, with KE and without JT, and without JE or KE. When the rate 
approaches the choked flow rate at wellhead (potential blowout scenario), the gas 
experiences an extreme expansion near the wellhead, resulting in the significantly 
increase of pressure gradient in the wellbore. It leads to the increase of kinetic energy 
contribution in Equation (44), thereby explaining the quick decrease of fluid temperature 
near the wellhead.  
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Figure 23. Fluid temperature profile in wellbore after 2.5 minutes near wellhead 
considering different components in heat transfer 
 
If KE is not considered in heat transfer model, as shown in Figure 23, the fluid 
temperature near the wellhead in the wellbore will not change significantly. On the other 
hand, Joule-Thomson Effect describes the fluid temperature change owing to the 
pressure changes when the fluid flows. Figure 23 shows that the fluid temperature is 
overall higher when the JT effect is not considered. In conclusion, based on our 
observations, the KE contributes to the fluid temperature change near the wellhead, 
while the JT affects the fluid temperature in the entire wellbore.  
Figure 24 illustrates how the KE and JT can affect the fluid temperature 
evolution in the blowout scenario. When KE term is neglected, the temperature is higher 
compared to the one considering KE, but has similar trend. The blowout rate declines 
with the increase in temperature. If the JT effect is not taken into account, the blowout 
rate and temperature decrease at the same time. The fluid temperature at wellhead will 
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barely change if neither of these two important components in heat transfer is 
considered. 
 
 
Figure 24. Wellhead temperature evolution considering different component in 
heat transfer 
 
Figure 21 shows the results of the blowout evolution. Many of the reservoir 
variables; however, cannot be known accurately and may have great uncertainties in an 
actual setting. That aspect is especially true for wells in the exploration phase. We 
adopted a probabilistic simulation approach in this section to gain insights into how the 
various reservoir parameters influence a blowout event. Table 4 shows the range of four 
independent variables in this three-level design. Figure 25 shows the low, medium, and 
high-level cases, reflecting the range of each independent variable. To calculate 
production loss, we assumed that the blowout lasted for 300 days.  
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Table 4. Reservoir parameters with uncertainties for blowout model 
 Low Medium High 
Formation thickness, ft 50 100 150 
Initial reservoir pressure, psia 5,387 5,985 6,584 
Reservoir radius, ft 2,952 3,280 3,608 
Permeability, md 1 2.3 5 
 
 
Figure 25. Probabilistic blowout behavior for Kikani et al. (1996) case 
 
The folded-Plackett-Burman (Wolff, 2010) design of experiments helped 
quantify the significance of each independent variable. This design captures both 
nonlinearities and interactions between the variables. Cumulative production loss during 
a 100-day blowout constituted the dependent variable. Figure 26 presents the Pareto 
chart of this analysis, signifying that both permeability and formation thickness 
constitute important variables. The vertical line defines the results within the 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure 26. Pareto chart of total discharge amount during gas well blowout for 
folded-Packett-Burman design 
 
Note that for certain combination of variables, the sonic velocity cannot be 
sustained. This item can be explored further by studying the tubing performance curve 
(TPC) and inflow performance relationship (IPR) curves. Figure 27 shows the TPC and 
IPR curve at low permeability of 1 md. The solid lines represent the IPR curves at 
different levels of reservoir pressure and the dashed line represents the TPC at constant 
wellhead pressure, which is close to atmosphere pressure. Note that nonlinearity of TPC 
is minimal because of the low-wellhead pressure. The operating points are between 6 
and 9 MMscf/D. However, the choked flow rate of gas in this field example at standard 
conditions is about 19.8 MMscf/D. Thus for a low-permeability reservoir as in this 
example, sonic velocity will not be reached even when the wellhead pressure approaches 
atmospheric conditions. In contrast, Figure 28 presents the TPC and IPR curves for a 
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high-permeability reservoir (5 md). The operating points are between 50 and 70 
MMscf/D, which are beyond the choked flow rate for this gas in the field example, 
indicating that the well will flow at sonic velocity. 
 
 
Figure 27. TPC and IPR curves at low level of permeability 
 
 
Figure 28. TPC and IPR curves at high level of permeability 
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The blowout model presented here is not only applicable for onshore gas wells, it 
also shows the potential application for offshore wells. For offshore wells, because of the 
hydrostatic pressure at a given water depth, the flow is unlikely to be choked. Therefore, 
the blowout behavior will be governed by the constant-wellhead pressure, but the other 
computational steps can follow the same procedure as discussed here. However, 
modeling the evolution of the oil plume and its dispersion in water will require a 
separate tool. 
In addition, the blowout model can provide valuable information for the well 
control operations. For a certain blowout incident, given the reservoir and fluid 
properties, the blowout rate and bottomhole pressure can be obtained by coupling the 
wellbore with reservoir. Such results can be used to determine the type and properties of 
killing fluids and pump capacity. If the pump rate is not enough to kill the well, the 
depth of injection string can be increased. In addition, larger pumps can be added based 
on the pressure profile provided by the blowout model. If the calculated pump capacity 
cannot be achieved, other techniques can be considered, such as drilling of relief wells. 
One difficulty with the proposed approach is that we assumed the blowout rate 
reaches the maximum value immediately after the occurrence of blowout. In reality, the 
blowout rate will increase from the normal production rate to the maximum value and 
then decline. Such increase of the rate in the beginning of the blowout event would take 
several minutes based on the study of Kikani et al. (1996). This short time period can be 
neglected when the blowout lasts for days. However, for blowouts lasting just a few 
 70 
 
hours, the early period where the blowout rate increase occurs will become significant 
for the prediction of total discharge during the blowout event. 
In this study, we provided a useful approach to modeling blowout events under 
the assumption of single tubing diameter, in absence of other wellhead restrictions. 
However, the model is capable of capturing geometry reflecting realistic situations. For 
example, following a blowout the wellhead may become dysfunctional but may still be 
in place, providing restrictions to fluid flow. This and other restrictions can be handled 
in the wellbore model, provided reasonable description of the geometry can be 
described. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 The mechanism and corresponding physical phenomenon of blowout events are 
investigated in the section. Understanding the importance of heat transfer is essential to 
accurately estimate the consequence of gas well blowout. The reservoir, wellbore, and 
their interactions are coupled together to demonstrate a full picture of the potential gas 
well blowout. A well-established computational algorithm is developed to effectively 
estimate the blowout rate and total discharge amount during the blowout incidents. The 
statistical analysis identifies the independent variables responsible for the maximum 
discharge; both reservoir permeability and the connected reservoir volume are the key 
variables. The model could serve as the basis of the risk assessment of blowout events 
which are discussed in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER III  
CONSEQUENCE MODELING OF OFFSHORE OIL WELL BLOWOUT 
 
A number of similarities between the modeling of gas and oil well blowout are 
identified in this section. However, one of the important differences is the various flow 
patterns of multiphase flows that take place during an oil well blowout. Estimation of 
transition among different plow patterns could accurately determine the blowout rate and 
the total discharge amount in the offshore environment. In addition, given the 
hydrostatic pressure by the sea water at the wellhead, the choked flow is much less likely 
to occur when considering the consequence modeling. 
 
3.1 Reservoir Model 
Due to the high pressure of the reservoir, it is reasonable to assume that there is 
no occurrence of phase separation in the reservoir (i.e., the reservoir pressure is always 
higher than the bubble point pressure). The material balance equation in this section to 
estimate the reservoir pressure is derived first based on the single phase oil and then 
expands to the two-phase flow. 
Single phase oil contains no gas, so the gas solubility ( sR ) is zero. The material 
balance for a single phase oil reservoir can be derived from thermodynamic knowledge. 
The basic thermodynamic equation is: 
 ( ) ( )T P
V V
dV dp dT
p T
 
 
 
  (72) 
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Changing volume into density yields: 
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  (73) 
The isothermal compressibility ( wc ) and thermal expansion coefficient (  ) are defined 
as follows: 
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Then, an analytic expression for the density as a function of pressure and 
temperature can be obtained by combining Equations (73), (74) and (75): 
 w
d
c dp dT



    (76) 
Equation (76) can be solved analytically: 
 ln ( ) ( )w sc sc
sc
c p p T T



      (77) 
where scp  and scT  represent the standard conditions (14.7 psi and 60 °F). Therefore, the 
density of single phase oil can be calculated. At any time t , the amount of oil in the 
reservoir is calculated by the original oil in place and cumulative production/loss: 
               0  Original oil in place Oil in place at time t Cumulative loss from time to t    (78) 
The differential form of Equation (78) is: 
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 eV d wdt     (79) 
where eV  is the drainage volume and w  is the mass flow rate. Based on the definition of 
isothermal compressibility ( wc ) given by Equation (74), Equation (79) is rewritten as: 
 
1
w
e
wdt
c
V dp
    (80) 
 
e w
dp w
dt V c
   (81) 
Since the oil density is an analytic function of pressure and temperature given by 
Equation (77), the average reservoir pressure can be obtained in field unit during the 
blowout by coupling Equations (77) and (81): 
 
2
0.234
( )
i
t e
qBt
p p
c h r 
    (82) 
where q  is the volumetric flow rate at standard condition, B  is oil formation volume 
factor, t  is time,   is porosity, tc  total compressibility, h  is the thickness of pay zone, 
and er  is the reservoir radius.  
Havlena (1963 and 1964) applied the general material balance to a two-phase 
reservoir. They used the initial oil in place and the ratio of the initial hydrocarbon 
volume in the gas cap to the initial hydrocarbon volume in the drainage area. Later, Dake 
(1983) presented the generalized expression of the material balance for a two-phase 
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reservoir. Under the assumption of no water saturation in the reservoir, the expression is 
given as:  
 
( ) ( )
[ ( ) ] [ ( 1)]
o oi g si s g
p o p s g oi
oi gi
B B B R R B
N B R R B NB m
B B
  
       (83) 
where pN  is the cumulative production/loss, oB  is the oil formation volume factor 
which is similar to the definition of gB , pR  is the producing gas-oil ratio, sR  is the gas 
solubility that describes the volume of gas contained in oil phase, N  is initial oil in 
place, and m  is the ratio of the initial hydrocarbon volume in the gas cap to the initial 
hydrocarbon volume in the reservoir. The correlations of these variables are shown in 
Appendix A. 
In this work, it is assumed that the pressure of the fluid in the reservoir will 
always be higher than the bubble point pressure to simplify the problem (e.g., single 
phase). Therefore, Equation (81) still can be applied to the two-phase reservoir. But the 
analytic expression for the density of the fluid in the reservoir is not applicable as the oil 
contains a significant amount of gas now. The density of the fluid is calculated by using 
correlations based on field experience shown in Appendix A. Then the average reservoir 
pressure can be obtained. 
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3.2 Wellbore Model 
3.2.1 Multiphase Flow Model 
The basis of the multiphase flow model is similar to the single phase gas flow. 
Therefore, Equations (6) to (8) and (14) are still valid. Combining these equations, the 
pressure gradient in the wellbore could be calculated as: 
 
2
( ) ( sin )
2
T
dp fv dv
g v
dz d dz

        (84) 
 Two- or three-phase fluid flows simultaneously through the same tubing always 
complicates the analysis of fluid flow in the wellbore. Even when the fluid coming from 
the reservoir at the bottomhole is single phase oil, the pressure and energy loss often 
results in separation of gas phase and oil phase. In this section, the main study objective 
is with two-phase flow—oil and gas in vertical and near-vertical systems. 
When two-phase flow exists, the different phases show a number of distinct 
configurations, named flow patterns. Recognizing flow patterns facilitates the modeling 
of two-phase flow. Each of the flow regimes should be modeled separately, as the oil/gas 
ratio is different in every flow regime. Generally, there are four major flow patterns, 
named bubbly, slug, churn, and annular as shown in Figure 29. 
At low gas velocity, the gas phase flow is distributed as small, nearly spherical 
bubbles through a continuous liquid medium; this is called bubbly flow. In vertical 
wells, bubbles flow uniformly throughout in the liquid phase. As the velocity of gas flow 
increases, the small bubbles in bubbly flow aggregate together, forming slug flow. In 
slug flow, the large gas bubbles have approximately the same diameter as the tubing and 
 76 
 
are known as Taylor bubbles. The successive gas bubbles are separated from the wall of 
tubing by a thin film of liquid. As the velocity of gas flow further increases, the large gas 
bubbles are broken down and the flow becomes churn flow. In churn flow, the shapes of 
the bubbles are irregular throughout the liquid phase. This kind of flow has an oscillatory 
or time varying characteristic. Such flow regime is also known as slug-annular 
transition. At very high gas flow rates, the gas flow takes place in the core of the tubing, 
forming annular flow. The gas flow is continuous along the wellbore, so that it forms a 
gas core and liquid thin film. Some liquid droplets usually are distributed in the gas core. 
In some extreme situations (e.g., blowout events), the liquid film will disappear, leaving 
only the gas core with a liquid mist. 
The changes of pressure and temperature lead to different flow patterns at 
various depths along the wellbore. For example, if the bottomhole pressure is higher than 
the bubble point pressure, a single phase oil flow that contains a large amount of gas can 
be expected at the bottomhole. When the fluid flows upward, the pressure will gradually 
drop. As the pressure drops below the bubble point pressure, the gas contained in the oil 
phase will start to come out from the mixture, resulting in bubbly flow. If the pressure 
drops further with upward movement of the fluid, more and more gas will separate from 
the mixture, leading to the whole range of flow regimes, shown in Figure 30. 
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Figure 29. Two-phase flow in vertical wells 
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Figure 30. Development of flow patterns in a wellbore 
 
A lot of effort has been made to recognize the flow patterns. Experimentally, 
some flow patterns can be observed at low flow rate in transparent pipes. A number of 
observation techniques have also been developed to aid the study of flow regimes, such 
as electrical, hot-wire, pressure, and optical probes. Signals provided by those probes 
can offer some indirect information for the analysis of flow patterns.  
 79 
 
From a computational simulation point of view, there are two approaches to 
model the flow-pattern development—flow regime maps and individual transition 
criteria. A number of flow-pattern maps are proposed by different researchers. Some of 
them can match the experimental data quite well and have been used widely in industry. 
The main idea of these flow-pattern maps is to generalize a map by choosing different 
parameters that will indirectly influence the transition among flow regimes. 
Figure 31 shows an example of flow-pattern map, which uses the superficial 
momentum flux of liquid and gas phases (
2
L sLv  and 
2
g sgv ) as the two axes. The typical 
flow-pattern map is based on an air and water mixture at low pressure, and steam and 
water data at high pressure from tubes with small diameters (1-3 cm). However, because 
the mixture in this map is water/air and steam/water mixtures, it might not capture some 
important properties of oil/gas mixtures. In addition, these empirical flow-pattern maps 
cannot aid modern computational models as they are difficult to be implemented into a 
computer program. Therefore, an alternative technique is needed to determine the flow 
regime transition and establish valid criteria for each transition.  
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Figure 31. Example of flow-pattern map 
 
Developing individual transition criteria is more flexible than the empirical flow-
pattern maps. This alternative approach is used in this work to model two-phase flow in 
a wellbore. 
 
Bubbly-Slug Flow Transition 
The small, near spherical bubbles agglomerate together, forming Taylor bubbles 
that are large enough to fill the tubing cross section. This results in the transition from 
bubbly flow to slug flow. If the velocity of bubbles increases, the collision frequency 
will go up. Based on experimental data, a gas volume fraction, gf , that is higher than 
0.25 leads to the transition to slug flow (Hasan, 1988a and Hasan, 1988b). Therefore, 
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0.25gf  might be considered as the criterion for the transition between bubbly flow and 
slug flow. The in-situ gas velocity, gv , is affected by the mixture velocity, mv , and 
buoyancy due to the density difference between the liquid and gas phases. The buoyancy 
can be expressed by the terminal rise velocity, v . 
0g mv C v v   (85) 
where 0C  = 1.2 suggested by references (Hasan, 1988 and Ansari, 1994), and the 
terminal rise velocity, v , follows the Harmathy equation (Harmathy, 1960).  
 
2 0.251.53[ ( ) / ]L g Lv g         (86) 
The in-situ velocity is hard to be measured in reality. Thus, in-situ velocity is 
related to superficial velocity, sgv , by /g sg gv v f . Then, the following expression is 
used for gas volume fraction in bubbly flow:  
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sg
g
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v
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C v v


  (87) 
In Equation (87), the gas fraction needs to be larger than 0.25 to reach slug flow. 
Therefore, the resulting expression for the transition between bubbly and slug flow is: 
 (0.429 0.357 )sinsg sLv v v     (88) 
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Slug-Churn Flow Transition 
In slug flow (shown in Figure 29), a number of small bubbles are distributed 
axially and separate the Taylor bubbles. When the gas flow rate increases, the interaction 
between the small bubbles and Taylor bubbles becomes significant. The transition 
between slug and churn flow occurs when such interaction is high enough to break up 
the long Taylor bubbles. Many researches have been conducted on the transition from 
slug flow to churn flow with empirical, semi-theoretical, and theoretical analyses 
(Barnea, 1987; Hasan, 1988 and Weisman, 1981). However, these studies cannot satisfy 
the application in the oil field. Other researcher (Brauner, 1986) proposed that the gas 
volume fraction cannot exceed 0.52 to maintain stable slug flow. Thus, 0 0.52C   can be 
used in Equation (85) and lead to the following condition for the presence of churn flow: 
 1.66 2.66sg sLv v v    (89) 
 
Churn-Annular Flow Transition 
At a high gas flow rate, the transition from churn flow to annular flow will 
happen. In this research, we follow the work by Taitel and others (Taitel, 1980), which 
suggested that the gas flow rate must be sufficiently high to support the liquid droplets in 
gas flow. Otherwise, the droplets will accumulate, resulting in churn or slug flow. The 
minimum required velocity to keep a droplet in suspension can be determined by 
performing a force balance on the droplet. Therefore, this analysis leads to the following 
expression for the minimum gas velocity to withstand annular flow in a wellbore: 
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2 0.253.1[ ( ) / ]sg L g gv g       (90) 
 
Conclusion 
The general pressure loss equation (Equation (84)) is still applicable to our 
analysis. However, all the properties need to be changed into the properties of oil and 
gas mixtures as follows: 
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The properties of mixtures depend on the gas volume fraction, and therefore are 
related to the flow regime. The correlations of these properties for oil and gas mixtures 
can be found in Appendix A. It should be noted that for a pipe with a constant cross 
sectional area, the liquid phase acceleration is negligible. Therefore the pressure loss due 
to velocity change only depends on gas phase acceleration. As a result, Equations (18)
and (20) are still applicable to the analysis of multi-phase flow in wellbore. 
 
3.3 Reservoir and Wellbore Interaction 
 The unified model is adopted here to describe the reservoir and wellbore 
interaction during the blowout events. The concept is similar to the Section 2.3.3 except 
that the pseudo pressure is only required for gas given its PVT relationships. Therefore, 
Equation (68) becomes: 
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 84 
 
All the remaining equations are same as in Section 2.3.3. 
 
3.4 Computational Algorithm 
The offshore oil well blowout duration is divided into small segments first, then 
at each time step:  
1. Guess a flow rate in STB/D. 
2. The average reservoir pressure could be obtained based on the guessed flow rate, 
initial reservoir pressure, and flow rate history by Equation (82).   
3. The bottomhole pressure is then calculated by Equation (92).   
4. Once the bottomhole pressure is known, a bottom-to-top calculation in wellbore 
could be performed so that the wellhead pressure can be calculated according to 
Equations (91). 
a) If the wellhead pressure is not equal to the hydrostatic pressure provided by 
sea water, go to Step 4 b); otherwise, go to Step 4 c) 
b) If the calculated wellhead pressure is larger than the hydrostatic pressure at 
wellhead, the flow rate needs to be increased; otherwise, it needs to be 
decreased. Apply the re-guessed flow rate and repeat Step 1 to 4 a) until 
convergence is reached. Then go to Step 5.  
c) Go to Step 5. 
5. Go to next time step. 
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3.5 Results and Discussion 
 Figure 32 shows an example of the changes of the multiphase flow patterns in the 
wellbore during a subsurface offshore oil blowout event. The mudline is set as 0 ft and 
the well depth is 12,300 ft. As can be seen, from the bottom of the well to the well depth 
of 7,995 ft, the gas is dissolved in the oil phase, forming a single phase flow. The 
reduction in pressure with the upward movement of the fluid results in bubbly flow for 
depths between 1,230 ft and 7,995 ft, and churn flow for the depth above 1,230 ft. Along 
with changes in flow patterns and decreasing pressure, gas velocity increases 
exponentially. The primary mechanism of such increase of gas velocity is the rapid 
expansion of liberated gas. The increased free gas lowers the mixture density, resulting 
in the increase of the mixture velocity. High fluid velocity, which favors more 
significant friction and kinetic energy loss, leads to the increase of the fluid pressure 
gradient. When the local fluid pressure is low, the decrease of mixture density is 
expected, which further increases the velocity and pressure gradient. Therefore, as the 
fluid approaches the wellhead, the gas velocity increases exponentially.  
 Similar to Chapter II, the reservoir and wellbore interaction model is validated 
with commercial software. As can be seen in Figure 33, the results from a commercial 
package and our blowout model shows a very good agreement, showing a smooth 
transition between early-time transient period and late-time pseudo steady-state at 
around 250 hr. 
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Figure 32. Multiphase fluid flow model in wellbore during blowout event 
 
 
Figure 33. Constant rate drawdown test of oil reservoir 
 
To validate the oil well blowout model presented in this dissertation, Deepwater 
Horizon incident is selected. The Macondo well was located in the Mississippi Canyon 
Block 252 of the Gulf of Mexico, 130 miles away from New Orleans. In April 20, 2010, 
the explosion of Deepwater Horizon drilling platform led to a blowout of the Macondo 
Single Phase 
Flow 
Bubbly Flow 
Churn Flow 
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well for 87 days, killing 11 operators. The blowout was finally capped on July 15, 2010. 
It is considered as one of the largest incidental marine oil spill in the history of oil and 
gas industry. The incident severely damaged the underwater equipment including the 
riser. In the beginning of the incident, there were two main leak points (Plume 
Calculation team, 2010). The main leak came from the broken end of the riser until the 
severing operations, which was far away from Blowout Preventer (BOP). After May 1, 
2010, a second leak source appeared in the kinked riser above the BOP. During the 
incident, a number of strategies to stop the flow of oil were proposed. Since it is difficult 
to access the well, and the prevention operations needed to be performed at the seafloor 
where the temperature is low and the pressure is high, none of these strategies was 
successful to cap the uncontrolled release. Public started to pay attention to the accurate 
estimation of the magnitude of the oil and gas discharged into the environment. This 
information is important for evaluating the environmental consequences of oil and gas 
release, developing proper control strategies and evaluating the liability of the operating 
companies for the environmental damage.   
The oil spill caused by Macondo incident was only collected up to 25,000 barrels 
per day by surface ships during the latter portion of the incident. The actual release 
observed from the bottom of the sea by camera was higher than the collection rate. 
Therefore, estimation of volume of oil discharged cannot rely on the collection data. 
Different government agencies, researchers, and companies calculated the blowout rate 
of Macondo well by various techniques. Some of the examples are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Example of blowout rate estimations for Macondo incident (Plume 
Calculation Team, 2010 and DOI 2011) 
Estimation techniques 
Estimation of blowout 
rate (STB/D) 
Using probability distributions to model the uncertainty 
implied in experts’ assessment  
46,000  
Analysis of videos of discharging flow  45,000 
Analysis of videos of discharging flow  30,000 to 40,000  
Analysis of videos of discharging flow  68000  
Measuring oil jet velocities using manual Feature 
Tracking Velocimetry  
61,000 ± 15,000  
Analyzing the velocity profile and trajectory profile of 
oil leak jets using established theory of turbulent jets  
89,000 with a range of 
62,000 to 116,000  
Simulating the trajectory of a buoyant oil leak jet using 
computational fluid dynamics  
55,000 to 70,200  
Acoustics analysis 60,000  
Reservoir modeling from 3-D seismic data  27,000 to 102,000  
Well modeling  30,000 to 118,000  
 
Oldenburg et al. (2012) used the software of T2Well and iTOUGH2 to couple 
the reservoir/wellbore flow to estimate the initial blowout rate for the Macondo well. 
They concluded that the most likely initial oil flow rate was 105,000 bbl/day assuming 
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100 ft of penetration depth. 500 Monte Carlo simulations were carried out to analyze the 
uncertainties of the reservoir and fluid properties. They found that the initial flow rate 
was strongly sensitive to the reservoir permeability. Table 6 shows the parameters in 
Oldenburg’s model. These parameters are used as the inputs for the oil blowout model 
presented in this dissertation to examine its validity. 
  
 
Table 6. Parameters used in Oldenburg study (2012) 
Parameters Value 
Temperature at the sea floor 41 °F 
Depth to the sea floor 5,067 ft 
Pressure at the sea floor 2,241 psia 
Length of 9 7∕8 in casing 7,700 ft 
ID of 9 7∕8 in casing 8.6 in 
Length of 7 ½ in casing 5,500 ft 
ID of 7 ½ in casing 6.1 in 
Depth below sea floor 13,300 ft 
Thickness 100 ft 
Porosity 22% 
Permeability 500 md 
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Table 6. Parameters used in Oldenburg study (2012) 
Parameters Value 
Pressure 12,000 psia 
Temperature 260 °F 
Oil gravity 35 API 
Gas-oil ratio 3000 scf/bbl 
Gas gravity 0.8 
 
Figure 34 shows the results of the oil well blowout model based on Oldenburg’s 
data. The initial blowout rate, as can be seen, is 109,511 bbl/day, shwoing a very good 
agreement with Oldenburg’s estimation with only 4% difference. This obtained initial 
blowout rate also agrees with the BP internal documents that estimates the initial 
blowout rate for hypothetical worst-case could reach about 100,000 bbl/day (DOJ, 
2012). The advantage of the oil well blowout analysis presented here is that it is an 
integrated tool that couples reservoir and wellbore together, so that no separate tools are 
needed. This convenience also enables us to calculate the dynamic blowout rate. Due to 
the reservoir pressure depletion, the simulation shows that the blowout rate at the end of 
the Macondo incident drops down to 52,039 bbl/day, and the total amount of discharge 
reaches over 6.25 million barrels of oil.  
 
Continu d 
 91 
 
 
Figure 34. Blowout rate and total production loss for Macondo well 
 
However, all the above estimations are based on the worst-case scenarios, and 
several conservative assumptions, such as no BOP restriction at wellhead, maximizes the 
blowout rate. BP, during the Macondo incident, measured the flowing pressure above 
and below the BOP, and concluded that 850 psig pressure was applied to the flow at 
wellhead due to the BOP restriction and additional 400 psig was created by other flow 
restrictions. Therefore, a more realistic wellhead flowing pressure would be 3,491 psig. 
Figure 35 shows the blowout rate and total discharge amount profile when such 
restrictions are taken into account. As can be seen, the initial blowout rate decreases to 
96,807 bbls/d and the total discharge amount drops to 5.41 million barrels. 
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Figure 35. Blowout rate and total production loss considering BOP restriction 
 
Similar to Section 2.5, a folded-Plackett-Burman design of experiments is 
performed to determine the significance of each independent variable. The variables 
selected here include the permeability, formation thickness, initial reservoir pressure, 
and reservoir radius. Three levels (i.e., low, medium, and high) are assigned for each of 
the variables, as shown in Table 7. Total amount of discharge during an 87 days blowout 
constituted the dependent variable. Figure 36 presents the Pareto chart of this analysis, 
signifying that permeability is the most important variable. The vertical line defines the 
results within the 95% confidence interval. This finding also matches the conclusion of 
the Oldenburg study. 
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Table 7. Independent variables variation for design of experiments 
 Low Medium High 
Formation thickness, ft 80 100 120 
Initial reservoir pressure, psia 9,600 12,000 14,400 
Reservoir radius, ft 2,886 3,608 4,330 
Permeability, md 400 500 600 
 
 
Figure 36. Pareto chart of total discharge amount of oil well blowout for folded-
Packett-Burman design 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
The oil well blowout mechanism and physics are evaluated in this chapter. The 
behavior of multi-phase flow is implemented into the consequence model to accurately 
estimate the blowout rate and total discharge amount based on a well-established 
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computational algorithm. The model shows that under different pressure and 
temperature, the oil and gas phases could form bubbly flow, slug flow, churn flow or 
even annular flow. The results of the model are compared with other studies for the 
Macondo incident and show a good agreement. The statistical analysis identifies the 
independent variables responsible for the maximum discharge; reservoir permeability, 
initial reservoir pressure and the formation thickness are the key variables. Among these 
three variables, the blowout rate and total discharge amount is strongly sensitive to the 
change of permeability. The model could serve as the basis of the risk assessment of 
blowout events which are discussed in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER IV  
PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF BLOWOUT EVENTS
2
 
 
 The definition of prevention is (CCPS, 2016): 
―The process of eliminating or preventing the hazards or risks associated with a 
particular activity. Prevention is sometimes used to describe actions taken in advance to 
reduce the likelihood of an undesired event.‖ 
The definition of mitigation is (CCPS, 2016): 
―Lessening the risk of an incident event sequence by acting on the source in a 
preventive way by reducing the likelihood of occurrence of the event, or in a protective 
way by reducing the magnitude of the event and/or the exposure of local persons or 
property.‖ 
As can be seen, the prevention and mitigation are always associated with the 
likelihood and consequence of an incident event. Although a number of techniques, such 
as Bow-Tie and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), could qualitatively or semi-
quantitatively evaluate prevention and mitigation actions, the quantitative determination 
of the prevention and mitigation measurements effectiveness requires a comprehensive 
understanding to the risk associated with blowout events. In this section, both 
consequence- and risk-based assessment of blowout events are presented. The 
                                                 
2 Part of this chapter is reprinted with permission from ―Flow rate and total discharge estimation in gas-
well blowouts‖ by Liu, R., Hasan, A. R. and Mannan, M. S. (2015). Journal of Natural Gas Science and 
Engineering, 26, 438-445. Copyright 2015 Elsevier. 
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effectiveness of the prevention and mitigation measurements and the risk reduction plan 
are discussed as well. 
 
4.1 Consequence-based Assessment of Blowout Events  
When a blowout happens, significant amount of fluid will be spewed out of the 
wellbore. Hydrocarbons coming out of the wellbore are flammable and hazardous. Thus, 
during an onshore blowout one of the following scenarios may play out given different 
conditions: 
 In the absence of an ignition source, the gas will disperse to the surroundings; the 
dispersion will be influenced by the wind speed. The toxicity, plume dispersion, 
and the consequent hazard need to be investigated. 
 In the presence of an ignition source, the gas/air mixture may ignite and result in 
jet fires and explosions. To evaluate fire and explosion hazards, we used heat 
flux intensity associated with jet fire and overpressure caused by explosion. 
Such hazardous scenarios are the major concerns for the personnel on the 
offshore platforms, or the surrounding population near the onshore wells. In the 
following section, an onshore sour gas well blowout is used an example to illustrate the 
consequence-based assessment to the blowout event. 
 
4.1.1 Plume Boundary 
To fully appreciate and quantify the risks associated with these hazards, we need 
to understand the details of a blowout. The methodology presented in this dissertation 
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provides an opportunity for all concerned to capture the evolution of blowout events 
under different operational conditions. The quantitative assessment of the risk related to 
blowout can also help the operational personnel to make the right decisions at right time. 
In the absence of ignition, a plume will form because of the dispersion of 
toxic/flammable gas. The shape of the plume depends on the wind speed and buoyancy 
effect. To gain a better understanding of the plume evolution, we considered low (9.8 
ft/sec), moderate (16.4 ft/sec), and strong (26.2 ft/sec) wind speeds to study the shape of 
the plume. The blowout is similar to the leak of a high-pressure tank to some extent. The 
blowout rate is the source-term on ground. If we assume that the blowout rate remains 
constant in short time period, the concentration of gas released in the plume is given by 
the following expression given by Crowl (Crowl, 2011):  
  
2 2
( , , ) exp ( )
42
[ ]m
y zx y
Q v y z
C x y z
x K Kx K K
      (93) 
Given that the preparedness and emergency response may be insufficient at the 
event’s inception, the first hour of a blowout event is considered. As the base case, we 
use the field data in Kikani’s work (Kikani, 1996) and assume the blowout rate to be 
constant in each time segment. Table 8 shows the blowout rate change within each time 
interval. 
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Table 8. Blowout rate change within time based on field example 
Time (Hours) Blowout Rate (MMscf/D) 
0-0.1 48.0 
0.1-0.5 41.3 
0.5-1 38.8 
 
Figure 37, Figure 38, and Figure 39 show the evolution of the plume under 
different wind speeds generated with a commercial software package PHAST (OGP, 
2010). This software package is a hazard-analysis tool that is often used by the chemical 
process industries, but is not very well known in the upstream side of the petroleum 
industry. The software can be used to model different scenarios, those involving 
discharge and dispersion, flammable situations, and explosions. Conservations of mass 
and momentum constitute the centerline of the dispersion plume. Gaussian distribution is 
then applied at centerline to determine the concentration and width of the plume. 
Overall, this tool adopts a unified modeling approach capturing jet, and heavy and 
passive phases.  
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Figure 37. Side view of plume caused by gas well blowout after 360 seconds 
 
 
Figure 38. Side view of plume caused by gas well blowout after 1,800 seconds 
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Figure 39. Side view of plume caused by gas well blowout after 3,600 seconds 
 
Figure 37 through Figure 39 illustrate the plume boundary wherein the 
concentration of gas is 100 ppm. Note that the top of the plume is higher for the low 
wind speed situation than others because of the buoyancy effect. At higher speeds, the 
buoyancy effect is reduced and the plume begins to descend onto the ground, causing 
health and safety concerns for personnel in the area. Thus, the mixing effect of released 
gas and air is enhanced with the increase of wind speed. Therefore, the plume affects 
larger area in low wind speed compared to the strong wind situations. In contrast, the 
decreasing blowout rate causes the shrinkage of the plume as can be observed in Figure 
38 and Figure 39. The plume could reach up to 4,700 feet away from the blowout 
location, prompting the need for evacuation of the residents and personnel in that area. 
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4.1.2 Explosions 
When there is an ignition source near the wellbore, the gas/air mixture may be 
ignited, leading to explosion and fire. The explosion of gas leads to a reaction front 
moving away from the ignition source, accompanied by a shock wave. Even when the 
reaction material is exhausted, the movement of the shock wave does not stop. The 
pressure resulting from the shock wave over normal atmospheric pressure is called 
overpressure. Overpressure is an important characterization of the consequence of an 
explosion. Table 9 shows the damage to common structures based on overpressure, 
following the work of Clancey (1972).  
 
Table 9. Damage estimates for common structures based on overpressure 
Overpressure (psi) Damage 
10 Total destruction of buildings 
5-7 Nearly complete destruction of houses 
2 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses 
0.3 ―Safe distance‖ 95% probability of no serious damage 
0.03 
Occasional breaking of large glass windows already 
under strain 
 
Here, we used TNT equivalency method to evaluate the overpressure situation. 
The equivalent mass of TNT is first calculated: 
 cTNT
TNT
m H
m
E
 
   (94) 
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In Equation (94), ETNT denotes the energy of explosion of TNT, which typically 
equals to 2,016 Btu/lbm. The overpressure can be empirically estimated by the 
equivalent mas of TNT and the distance from the explosion point based on the 
experiments of explosives (Glasstone, 1962 and Baker, 1973): 
 
2
2 2 2
1616 1 ( )
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1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
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When the effect of explosion is evaluated conservatively, the realistic worst-case 
scenario is always considered, meaning that the ignition source is present right after the 
initiation of blowout. During this period the plume of the released gas has the largest 
volume, leading to the largest area affected by of explosion. Figure 40 presents the 
worst-case scenario of the explosion when the ignition source is 5 ft away from the well. 
The circle indicates an overpressure of 0.3 psi, which is considered a safety limitation to 
buildings and personnel. Any buildings and personnel inside the circle will be in danger 
if explosion occurred soon after the blowout event. As Figure 40 shows, distance of 150 
ft away from the blowout source is covered by the overpressure higher than 0.3 psi when 
the wind speed is 9.8 ft/sec. With the increase of wind speed, the unsafe area becomes 
smaller.  
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Figure 40. Late explosion or worst-case scenario caused by blowout incident 
 
4.1.3 Jet Fire 
In addition to explosions, a gas well blowout could lead to jet fire. A jet fire is a 
flame with turbulent diffusion owing to the combustion of continuous released 
hydrocarbon gas in a particular direction. Many of the jet fires are followed by 
explosion. The jet fires may occur right after the blowout incident in presence of an 
ignition source. In that case, the radiation generated by jet fire must be taken into 
account. HSE (2004) suggested that personnel are able to survive and escape from the 
exposure to heat flux less than 1,584 Btu/hr-ft
2
. Figure 41 shows the safe distance for 
personnel in presence of a jet fire resulting from the blowout incident. The circles 
indicate the heat flux of 1,584 Btu/hr-ft
2 
under different wind speeds. When wind speed 
increases, the circle starts to shift in the direction of wind and the affected area depends 
on the shape of the plume. 
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Figure 41. Heat flux intensity radius for jet fire caused by blowout incident 
 
4.1.4 Discussion 
 Compared to the WCD scenarios, this methodology, as a consequence-based 
approach, provides more realistic worst-case scenario assessment. The areas which could 
be potentially affected by the blowout events need to be taken into consideration during 
the selection of drilling locations. Minimum population should be allowed in such area 
with proper toxic/flammable gas sensors and appropriate emergency response plan, to 
avoid tragedies like Kaixian gas well blowout from happening again. 
 In addition, using PHAST to evaluate the impacted area is only one of the 
options. PHAST is specialized to model dispersion behavior in open field. One of the 
important assumptions is that it does not consider the obstruction effect of the trees, 
hills, and buildings. Such assumption leads to a conservative assessment of the 
consequence of the blowout events. If more accurate results are desired, the detailed 
surrounding neighborhood information and CFD tools should be used. 
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 Moreover, the wind is assumed to be from one direction only since no probability 
distribution is considered in the consequence-based approach. In the real application, the 
wind direction should always be towards the direction that could result in the most 
severe consequences. 
 In this section, TNT equivalent approach is adopted to evaluate the consequence 
of the potential explosions due to the gas well blowout. When lacking other information, 
TNT equivalent model is usually used to estimate the energy of the explosion. However, 
literature reveals that TNT equivalent model always estimates higher peak overpressure 
in the near field, and lower in the far field compared to other models (Mannan, 2012). In 
other words, TNT equivalent model is conservative in the near field and not conservative 
in the far field. Additional methods are also available in PHAST if more information of 
the surroundings of the site could be provided such as TNO multi-energy model or 
Baker-Strehlow-Tang (BST) model. 
  
4.2 Risk-Based Assessment of Blowout Events 
 The risk-based assessment of blowout events can quantitatively determine the 
blowout risk for the wells not only in the planning phase but also in the operational 
phase. A well-established blowout consequence model couples the nature of transient-
fluid flow in the reservoir and the fluid and heat flows in the wellbore. Combining the 
consequence model and the uncertainties from both historical database and well-specific 
parameters provide great opportunities to understand and manage the blowout risk. In 
addition, a case study is presented to demonstrate how this method could be practically 
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applied in typical industrial settings. The risk reduction plan is also discussed in the later 
sections by statistical and sensitivity analysis. 
 
4.2.1 Methodology 
 Blowout events, categorized into three groups – surface blowout, subsurface 
blowout and underground blowouts – could occur during various offshore operations. 
This research focuses on the subsurface blowout as it imposes greatest impact to the 
marine environment. The NORSOK Standard D-010 (NORSOK, 2004) requires two 
independent barriers to be present during all well operations. The primary barrier is 
typically the drilling mud that could balance the pore pressure, while casing, cement, 
BOP and other associated equipment are generally considered as the secondary barriers. 
Here the investigation of interest is how the secondary barriers could affect the offshore 
drilling well blowout risk, as we assume that the blowout incident has happened, 
indicating the failure of primary barrier.  
It is a common practice to acquire historical data and statistics from the database 
for the purpose of risk assessment study. SINTEF (2013) database documents blowout 
occurrence information, including locations, type of operation when blowout happens, 
well configurations, types of blowout, consequences and so on. The database is updated 
and an annual report is issued every year. Scandpower summarizes the SINTEF database 
and issues Blowout and Well Release Frequencies Report Based on SINTEF Offshore 
Blowout Database. Such databases are considered the main information source when 
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conducting Environmental Risk Analysis and Quantitative Risk Assessments of blowout 
events.  
However, the basic idea of historical generic data is to normalize all the 
information of well blowout events to provide representative cases for the study purpose. 
These databases, therefore, lose the uniqueness that each well has. The consequences of 
a blowout event depends on specific reservoir conditions, operations, and well 
configurations. The risk level associated with each well is unique due to such factors, 
which cannot be reflected in the generic data. More importantly, the representative case 
provides only the frequency of blowout based on the historical data, but gives very 
limited consideration to the blowout risk reduction and mitigation measures. Thus, we 
propose a ―hybrid‖ risk model in this paper, which takes not only the historical incident 
statistics but also the unique information of the well (i.e., geographical uncertainties, 
well configuration and the types of operations) into account. 
 
Generic Data 
Many parameters influence the consequences of well blowouts; these variables 
can be obtained from historical database. Here we select some important ones including: 
blowout duration, blowout path, and BOP restriction. 
Various efforts, such as bridging, crew intervention, capping, and drilling the 
relief wells, could terminate a blowout incident. These actions require differing amount 
of time to be implemented and activated. For example, natural bridging may only take 
several days to self-kill the blowout, while drilling a relief well might need about 75 
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days (ACONA, 2012). Figure 42 shows the cumulative probability of blowout duration 
taking all the control methods into account based on the SINTEF database. 
 
 
Figure 42. Cumulative probability of blowout duration from SINTEF database 
 
The probability of blowout duration is calculated by a conservative approach. 
The upper bound of each range is selected as the representative duration, except for the 
duration larger than 14 days. The probability distribution of blowout duration is shown 
in the table below. 
 
Table 10. Probability distribution of blowout durations 
Duration Range (days) <2 2-14 >14 
Representative duration (days) 2 14 50 
Probability 0.67 0.17 0.16 
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As mentioned earlier, once blowout occurs, the fluid could flow through the drill 
string, the annulus, or the open hole, depending on the BOP status and the position of 
drill string. Among these three paths, the flow through annulus is considered as the most 
likely scenario. When the pore pressure is predicted inaccurately, and the primary barrier 
is compromised, the influx of hydrocarbons from high pressure payzone would occur 
through the annulus. In addition, the swabbing effect – pulling the drill string out of the 
borehole – could decrease wellbore pressure, possibly allowing a blowout with the 
hydrocarbons flow through the annulus. The flow through drill strings requires not only 
the influx from the reservoir, but also the failure of drill string safety valve which is one 
of the barriers to prevent back flow in drill string.  In addition, it is unlikely that the 
hydrocarbons would flow through the drilling string due to the downward influx of the 
drilling fluid. Moreover, when a possible hydrocarbon influx happens without the 
presence of drill strings in the wellbore (e.g., when completely pulled out of the 
wellbore), an open hole blowout event could occur. But taking the well-maintained 
drilling fluid weight into consideration, this scenario is in general unlikely. The table 
below provides the flow path probability distribution during drilling operation according 
to the SINTEF database. 
 
Table 11. Probability distribution of blowout flow paths 
Flow Path Probability 
Drilling String 0.06 
Annulus 0.88 
Open Hole 0.06 
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BOP, as one of the secondary barriers, is considered as highly reliable equipment 
with several independent rams inside. The risk of a total failure of a BOP, therefore, 
would be low. However, once a blowout occurs, it is obvious that the BOP has either 
completely or partially failed. The probability of BOP partially functioning is assumed to 
be 0.7, while the probability of complete failure of BOP is 0.3 based on the OLF 
guidelines (OLF, 2004). When the BOP only closes partly, the opening fraction of BOP 
is assumed to be 5%. 
 
Well Specific Parameter 
 Each well is specific in terms of geographical information and well 
configurations. The geographical information investigated here includes reservoir 
pressure, porosity, permeability and so forth. Different tubing and casing diameters and 
the penetration depths could be readily handled in our blowout simulation tool. The 
reservoir pressure that can be obtained dynamically with the progress of drilling 
activities is not considered as an uncertainty in this model, but as an important input to 
determine the blowout behaviors. The porosity and permeability information relies on 
the seismic data and generally becomes available with significant uncertainties. The 
distributions of such highly location dependent parameters are discussed in the case 
study in later section. 
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Scenario Probability 
Combining the multiple uncertainties distribution discussed above, the spectrum 
of blowout scenarios with different ranges of potential blowout rate and total discharge 
amount could be estimated. Each blowout scenario accompanies a unique probability 
depending on the assumptions of the probability distribution and availability of 
geographical data. The sum of the probability associated with each scenario equals one. 
Figure 43 presents some of the potential blowout scenarios and how the potential 
blowout scenarios are determined. It should be noted that the probability distributions of 
porosity and permeability is only for illustrative purpose, and these distributions should 
be obtained specifically depending on the locations of the wells. Our method provides 
opportunities to combine generic historical data with well specific uncertainties. One 
potential blowout scenario probability is calculated by multiplying the conditional 
probabilities. For example, when hydrocarbons flow through high porosity and low 
permeability formation, leading to a blowout through drill string for 2 days with the 
completed failure of BOP, the probability of this scenario would be: P = 0.06 × 0.67 × 
0.3 × 0.21 × 0.29 = 0.000734. 
The dynamic blowout rate and total amount of oil spill could be calculated for 
each potential blowout scenario. The product summation of the total amount of oil spill 
and corresponding probability yields the well specific blowout risk. This serves as the 
base case for the further barrier effectiveness and risk reduction studies.   
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Figure 43. Illustration of scenario probability calculation for blowout risk 
 
4.2.2 Case Study 
 In this section we present a case study using the flow modeling simulator we 
have developed combined with the generic and specific probabilities to illustrate how 
this approach could be practically used in the industry application. As discussed above, 
the geographical uncertainties such as permeability and porosity are dependent on the 
location of wells. Figure 44 and Figure 45 show the porosity and permeability 
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distribution at two offshore wells in the Bredasdrop Basin located near the south coast of 
South Africa (Hanson Mbi, 2006). Three levels of porosity are selected (i.e., low, 
medium and high) with respect to the probability distribution as shown in Table 12. 
Clear dependency between the porosity and permeability could be observed from Figure 
44 and Figure 45. Therefore, the probability distribution of permeability is determined at 
each level of porosity separately. As shown in Table 13, at low and medium level of 
porosity, due to lack of enough data points, only two levels are selected for permeability 
(i.e., low and high), and three levels (i.e. low, medium and high) are identified at high 
level of porosity. Both parameters are weighted averaged at each level and such averages 
serve as the representative values for the potential blowout scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 44. Porosity-permeability scatter plot for well E-AD1 
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Figure 45. Porosity-permeability scatter plot for Well E-CA1 
 
Table 12. Representative values and probability of porosity for wells at Bredasdrop 
Basin 
Porosity 
Level 
Min. Value 
(%) 
Max. Value 
(%) 
Weighted Average 
(%) 
Probability 
Low 0 8 5.8 0.21 
Medium 8 14 10.6 0.58 
High 14 18 15.3 0.21 
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Table 13. Representative values and probability of permeability for wells at 
Bredasdrop Basin 
Porosity 
Level 
Permeability 
Level 
Min. 
Value 
(md) 
Max. 
Value 
(md) 
Weighted 
Average (md) 
Probability 
Low 
Low 0 0.1 0.05 0.70 
High 0.1 4 0.8 0.30 
Medium 
Low 0 10 5.0 0.63 
High 10 275 49.3 0.37 
High 
Low 10 50 35.6 0.29 
Medium 50 200 112.5 0.55 
High 200 450 297.2 0.16 
 
The wellbore and reservoir in the case study are hypothetical but based on the 
typical parameter values used in practice. The well and reservoir parameters are 
presented in Table 14. A total of 126 potential blowout scenarios are established with 
unique probabilities to include all the variations of the uncertainties discussed above. 
Although the reservoir pressure and penetration depth are considered as inputs in this 
case, real-time measurements of these parameters could be dynamically updated to 
reflect accurate risk results in real field application. 
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Table 14. Parameter used in case study 
Parameters Value 
Water Depth, ft 4,911 
Well Depth, ft 12,300 
Casing Inner Diameter, in 9 
Drill String Inner Diameter, in 3.5 
Penetration Depth, ft 100 
Reservoir Radius, ft 3,608 
Reservoir Pressure, psia 11,856 
Reservoir Temperature, °F 276.8 
Oil gravity, API 35 
Gas-oil ratio, scf/bbl 1,600 
Gas gravity 0.83 
 
After simulating all the potential blowout scenarios, the results are rounded up 
and the probabilities of similar results are combined together to reflect the major 
contributors to the blowout probability. As can be seen in Figure 46, the minimal amount 
of potential oil spill is about 200 bbls, while the maximum oil spill could potentially 
reach 1.3 million bbls. The total risk of potential oil spill for this hypothetical well is 
around 40,000 bbls. Figure 46 also indicates that the tragedy like Macondo incident, in 
which the total amount of production discharge is in the millions of barrels, belongs to 
the category of high-consequence and low-probability event. 
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Figure 46. Probability and total amount of oil spill for all potential blowout 
scenarios 
 
4.2.3 Prevention and Mitigation 
Understanding Significance of Uncertainties 
 Figure 46 presents a comprehensive picture of potential blowout risk. The effects 
of uncertainties in the blowout risk, however, are not fully demonstrated. It is important 
to quantify the significance of the uncertainties so that the appropriate barriers could be 
added or enhanced to better manage the blowout risk. The folded-Plackett-Burman 
design of experiments (Wolff, 2010) is adopted here to understand how the uncertainties 
would affect the risk results. This method captures both nonlinearities and interactions 
between the uncertainties. Only the uncertainties, including blowout duration, flow path 
and BOP status that could be reduced by prevention or mitigation barriers are selected to 
guide the barrier management strategies. Three levels – low, medium, and high – are 
assigned to each uncertainty. The weighted average of the oil spill amount, taking 
uncertainties both from generic data and well-specific parameters into account, serves as 
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the dependent variable. Figure 47 shows the Pareto chart of this analysis, indicating that 
all the uncertainties are important to the total blowout risk. The vertical line defines the 
results within the 95% confidence interval. Compared to the single WCD value, this 
method enables operators to identify and manage the important barriers to better control 
the risk associated with the uncontrolled wellbore flow events. For example, as indicated 
in Figure 47, blowout duration is important to determine the blowout risk. Operators can 
only accurately estimate the potential amount of the oil discharge by coupling the 
blowout duration with the dynamic blowout rate, and therefore could demonstrate the 
blowout risk of their planning wells and manage the risk to the acceptable level. 
 
 
Figure 47. Pareto chart for folded-Packett-Burman design 
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Values of Barriers 
For the purpose of barrier management, evaluating the values of the barriers 
could help to reasonably allocate limited resources to enhance the safety performance. 
The blowout risk assessment in this paper provides operators a great opportunity to 
identify the important barriers. When a barrier is added or removed, the total risk of 
blowout will change accordingly. For example, as shown in Figure 48, assuming 
additional blind rams could completely prevent the open hole blowout from happening, 
the total risk is reduced by 3.1%. On the other hand, missing drill string safety valve 
could fail to stop the hydrocarbon flow through tubing, leading to an open hole blowout 
with higher probability. Figure 48 indicates that missing drill string safety valve could 
result in an increase of total blowout risk by 4.9%. Another example illustrated by 
Figure 49 is that the risk could be reduced by up to 67.5% when the BOP complete 
failure probability decreases from 30% for the base case to 0% for an ideal case. An 
effective maintenance and inspection program for BOP system is required to reduce the 
BOP complete failure probability. 
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Figure 48. Example of risk change when adding or removing barriers 
 
 
Figure 49. Example of effect of BOP maintenance and inspection to blowout risk 
 
Risk Reduction Plan 
 Figure 46 also provides valuable information to identify the major risk 
contributors. The smaller spills do not contribute significantly to the blowout risk 
although their probabilities are high. Table 15 shows the all the risk contributors to the 
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total blowout risk for this case. As can be seen, most of the major risk contributors are 
associated with long blowout duration and complete failure of BOP with significant 
amount of oil spill over 100,000 bbls. The only exception can be found at the risk 
contributor (No. 4) with less severe consequence but much higher probability. It 
indicates that identification of major risk contributors cannot solely rely on the 
determination of consequence or probability, and hence a comprehensive risk assessment 
is needed. Table 15 also suggests that the risk reduction plan, as a part of the risk 
assessment study, should focus on reducing the likelihood or the consequences of such 
hazardous scenarios. 
 
 
Table 15. Risk contributors to total blowout risk in case study 
Risk 
Ranking 
Scenarios 
Total 
Spill 
(bbl) 
Probability 
Risk 
Contribution Flow 
Path 
Duration 
(days) 
BOP 
Opening 
Fraction 
Porosity 
(%) 
Perm. 
(md) 
1 Annulus 50 100% 10.6 49.3 816428 0.009065 18.8445% 
2 Annulus 50 100% 15.3 112.5 994439 0.004879 12.3537% 
3 Annulus 50 100% 10.6 5 236995 0.015434 9.3142% 
4 Annulus 50 5% 10.6 5 66811 0.036014 6.1267% 
5 Annulus 50 100% 15.3 35.6 776430 0.002572 5.0858% 
6 Annulus 50 5% 10.6 49.3 78181 0.021151 4.2106% 
7 Annulus 9 100% 10.6 49.3 166413 0.009631 4.0811% 
8 Annulus 50 100% 15.3 297.2 1082677 0.001419 3.9127% 
9 Annulus 2 100% 10.6 49.3 38478 0.037958 3.7191% 
10 Annulus 9 100% 15.3 112.5 198756 0.005184 2.6234% 
11 Annulus 2 100% 15.3 112.5 45341 0.02043 2.3586% 
12 Annulus 50 5% 15.3 112.5 79064 0.011384 2.2918% 
13 Annulus 9 100% 10.6 5 48561 0.016399 2.0278% 
14 Annulus 2 100% 10.6 5 12087 0.064632 1.9892% 
15 
Open 
hole 
50 100% 10.6 49.3 926884 0.000618 1.4587% 
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Table 15. Risk contributors to total blowout risk in case study 
Risk 
Ranking 
Scenarios 
Total 
Spill 
(bbl) 
Probability 
Risk 
Contribution Flow 
Path 
Duration 
(days) 
BOP 
Opening 
Fraction 
Porosity 
(%) 
Perm. 
(md) 
16 Annulus 9 5% 10.6 5 12467 0.038265 1.2147% 
17 Annulus 50 5% 15.3 35.6 78022 0.006002 1.1925% 
18 Annulus 2 5% 10.6 5 2844 0.150808 1.0922% 
19 Annulus 9 100% 15.3 35.6 152878 0.002733 1.0640% 
20 
Open 
hole 
50 100% 15.3 112.5 1161211 0.000333 0.9836% 
21 Annulus 2 100% 15.3 35.6 35439 0.010772 0.9721% 
22 Annulus 9 100% 15.3 297.2 218432 0.001508 0.8387% 
23 Annulus 9 5% 10.6 49.3 14238 0.022473 0.8147% 
24 Annulus 2 100% 15.3 297.2 49671 0.005943 0.7517% 
25 Annulus 2 5% 10.6 49.3 3190 0.08857 0.7193% 
26 Annulus 50 5% 15.3 297.2 79418 0.003312 0.6697% 
27 
Open 
hole 
50 100% 10.6 5 239392 0.001052 0.6415% 
28 Annulus 50 5% 5.8 0.8 33721 0.006209 0.5332% 
29 
Open 
hole 
50 5% 10.6 5 77856 0.002455 0.4868% 
30 Annulus 9 5% 15.3 112.5 14442 0.012095 0.4448% 
31 Annulus 2 5% 15.3 112.5 3229 0.047669 0.3919% 
32 
Open 
hole 
50 100% 15.3 35.6 875136 0.000175 0.3908% 
33 Tubing 50 100% 10.6 5 135717 0.001052 0.3637% 
34 
Open 
hole 
50 5% 10.6 49.3 94765 0.001442 0.3480% 
35 Tubing 50 100% 10.6 49.3 208411 0.000618 0.3280% 
36 
Open 
hole 
9 100% 10.6 49.3 191980 0.000657 0.3210% 
37 
Open 
hole 
50 100% 15.3 297.2 1283607 9.68E-05 0.3163% 
38 
Open 
hole 
2 100% 10.6 49.3 44684 0.002588 0.2945% 
39 Annulus 50 100% 5.8 0.8 41806 0.002661 0.2833% 
40 Annulus 9 5% 15.3 35.6 14257 0.006377 0.2315% 
41 
Open 
hole 
9 100% 15.3 112.5 236252 0.000353 0.2126% 
42 Annulus 2 5% 15.3 35.6 3190 0.025135 0.2041% 
43 
Open 
hole 
2 100% 15.3 112.5 54153 0.001393 0.1921% 
44 
Open 
hole 
50 5% 15.3 112.5 96392 0.000776 0.1905% 
45 Tubing 50 100% 15.3 112.5 218640 0.000333 0.1852% 
46 Open 9 100% 10.6 5 49244 0.001118 0.1402% 
Continued 
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Table 15. Risk contributors to total blowout risk in case study 
Risk 
Ranking 
Scenarios 
Total 
Spill 
(bbl) 
Probability 
Risk 
Contribution Flow 
Path 
Duration 
(days) 
BOP 
Opening 
Fraction 
Porosity 
(%) 
Perm. 
(md) 
hole 
47 
Open 
hole 
2 100% 10.6 5 12310 0.004407 0.1381% 
48 Annulus 9 5% 15.3 297.2 14400 0.003519 0.1290% 
49 Annulus 50 5% 5.8 0.05 3234 0.014488 0.1193% 
50 Annulus 2 5% 15.3 297.2 3220 0.013867 0.1137% 
51 Annulus 9 5% 5.8 0.8 6674 0.006597 0.1121% 
52 Annulus 2 5% 5.8 0.8 1613 0.026001 0.1068% 
53 
Open 
hole 
50 5% 15.3 35.6 94208 0.000409 0.0982% 
54 Tubing 50 100% 15.3 35.6 205856 0.000175 0.0919% 
55 Tubing 50 5% 10.6 5 14520 0.002455 0.0908% 
56 
Open 
hole 
2 5% 10.6 5 3339 0.010282 0.0874% 
57 
Open 
hole 
9 100% 15.3 35.6 174296 0.000186 0.0827% 
58 
Open 
hole 
2 100% 15.3 35.6 40631 0.000734 0.0760% 
59 Tubing 9 100% 10.6 5 25850 0.001118 0.0736% 
60 
Open 
hole 
9 100% 15.3 297.2 264467 0.000103 0.0692% 
61 
Open 
hole 
9 5% 10.6 49.3 17472 0.001532 0.0682% 
62 Tubing 2 100% 10.6 5 6018 0.004407 0.0675% 
63 Tubing 9 100% 10.6 49.3 38793 0.000657 0.0649% 
64 Annulus 2 100% 5.8 0.8 2216 0.011143 0.0629% 
65 
Open 
hole 
9 5% 10.6 5 9440 0.002609 0.0627% 
66 Annulus 9 100% 5.8 0.8 8687 0.002827 0.0625% 
67 
Open 
hole 
2 100% 15.3 297.2 60405 0.000405 0.0623% 
68 
Open 
hole 
2 5% 10.6 49.3 3900 0.006039 0.0600% 
69 Tubing 2 100% 10.6 49.3 8710 0.002588 0.0574% 
70 
Open 
hole 
50 5% 15.3 297.2 96835 0.000226 0.0557% 
71 Tubing 50 100% 15.3 297.2 222620 9.68E-05 0.0549% 
72 Tubing 50 5% 10.6 49.3 14831 0.001442 0.0545% 
73 Annulus 50 100% 5.8 0.05 3238 0.006209 0.0512% 
74 
Open 
hole 
50 5% 5.8 0.8 35919 0.000423 0.0387% 
75 
Open 
hole 
9 5% 15.3 112.5 17651 0.000825 0.0371% 
Continued 
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Table 15. Risk contributors to total blowout risk in case study 
Risk 
Ranking 
Scenarios 
Total 
Spill 
(bbl) 
Probability 
Risk 
Contribution Flow 
Path 
Duration 
(days) 
BOP 
Opening 
Fraction 
Porosity 
(%) 
Perm. 
(md) 
76 Tubing 9 100% 15.3 112.5 40304 0.000353 0.0363% 
77 
Open 
hole 
2 5% 15.3 112.5 3948 0.00325 0.0327% 
78 Tubing 2 100% 15.3 112.5 9012 0.001393 0.0320% 
79 Tubing 50 5% 15.3 112.5 14850 0.000776 0.0293% 
80 Annulus 2 5% 5.8 0.05 182 0.06067 0.0281% 
81 Annulus 9 5% 5.8 0.05 690 0.015394 0.0271% 
82 
Open 
hole 
50 100% 5.8 0.8 41653 0.000181 0.0192% 
83 Tubing 50 100% 5.8 0.8 41559 0.000181 0.0192% 
84 
Open 
hole 
9 5% 15.3 35.6 17275 0.000435 0.0191% 
85 Tubing 9 100% 15.3 35.6 38006 0.000186 0.0180% 
86 Tubing 9 5% 10.6 5 2639 0.002609 0.0175% 
87 
Open 
hole 
2 5% 15.3 35.6 3889 0.001714 0.0170% 
88 Tubing 2 100% 15.3 35.6 8541 0.000734 0.0160% 
89 Tubing 50 5% 15.3 35.6 14835 0.000409 0.0155% 
90 Tubing 2 5% 10.6 5 590 0.010282 0.0155% 
91 Tubing 50 5% 5.8 0.8 12933 0.000423 0.0139% 
92 Annulus 2 100% 5.8 0.05 183 0.026001 0.0121% 
93 Annulus 9 100% 5.8 0.05 692 0.006597 0.0116% 
94 
Open 
hole 
9 5% 15.3 297.2 17625 0.00024 0.0108% 
95 Tubing 9 100% 15.3 297.2 41056 0.000103 0.0107% 
96 Tubing 9 5% 10.6 49.3 2680 0.001532 0.0105% 
97 
Open 
hole 
2 5% 15.3 297.2 3941 0.000946 0.0095% 
98 Tubing 2 100% 15.3 297.2 9170 0.000405 0.0095% 
99 Tubing 2 5% 10.6 49.3 597 0.006039 0.0092% 
100 Tubing 50 5% 15.3 297.2 14869 0.000226 0.0085% 
101 Tubing 50 5% 5.8 0.05 3269 0.000988 0.0082% 
102 
Open 
hole 
9 5% 5.8 0.8 7108 0.00045 0.0081% 
103 
Open 
hole 
50 5% 5.8 0.05 3234 0.000988 0.0081% 
104 
Open 
hole 
2 5% 5.8 0.8 1736 0.001773 0.0078% 
105 Tubing 9 5% 15.3 112.5 2687 0.000825 0.0056% 
106 Tubing 2 5% 15.3 112.5 599 0.00325 0.0050% 
107 Open 2 100% 5.8 0.8 2208 0.00076 0.0043% 
Continued 
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Table 15. Risk contributors to total blowout risk in case study 
Risk 
Ranking 
Scenarios 
Total 
Spill 
(bbl) 
Probability 
Risk 
Contribution Flow 
Path 
Duration 
(days) 
BOP 
Opening 
Fraction 
Porosity 
(%) 
Perm. 
(md) 
hole 
108 
Open 
hole 
9 100% 5.8 0.8 8656 0.000193 0.0042% 
109 Tubing 9 100% 5.8 0.8 8528 0.000193 0.0042% 
110 Tubing 2 100% 5.8 0. 8 2142 0.00076 0.0041% 
111 Tubing 50 100% 5.8 0.05 3243 0.000423 0.0035% 
112 
Open 
hole 
50 100% 5.8 0.05 3237 0.000423 0.0035% 
113 Tubing 9 5% 15.3 35.6 2676 0.000435 0.0030% 
114 Tubing 9 5% 5.8 0.8 2384 0.00045 0.0027% 
115 Tubing 2 5% 15.3 35.6 597 0.001714 0.0026% 
116 Tubing 2 5% 5.8 0.8 540 0.001773 0.0024% 
117 
Open 
hole 
2 5% 5.8 0.05 182 0.004137 0.0019% 
118 Tubing 9 5% 5.8 0.05 699 0.00105 0.0019% 
119 
Open 
hole 
9 5% 5.8 0.05 690 0.00105 0.0018% 
120 Tubing 2 5% 5.8 0.05 172 0.004137 0.0018% 
121 Tubing 9 5% 15.3 297.2 2690 0.00024 0.0016% 
122 Tubing 2 5% 15.3 297.2 599 0.000946 0.0014% 
123 Tubing 2 100% 5.8 0.05 185 0.001773 0.0008% 
124 
Open 
hole 
2 100% 5.8 0.05 182 0.001773 0.0008% 
125 Tubing 9 100% 5.8 0.05 693 0.00045 0.0008% 
126 
Open 
hole 
9 100% 5.8 0.05 691 0.00045 0.0008% 
 
Various measures could effectively reduce the likelihood of potential blowout 
scenarios with significant consequences. For example, a well-prepared emergency 
response plan could be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of long blowout duration (i.e., 
50 days). Literature shows that capping is widely used as an intervention measure for 
subsea blowout events, and could reduce the overall duration of blowout (OGP/IPIECA, 
2013). Typically, it takes around 10 days for the capping devices to be assembled 
Continued 
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(ACONA, 2012). Thus, a good capping plan could greatly reduce the probability of long 
blowout duration. In addition, the BOP control system failure has been found as the 
major cause for the blowout event (Mide, 2010). A study concluded that 86% of the 
blowout incidents could be attributed to the failure of BOP control system (DNV, 1999). 
The BOP complete failure probability could be reduced by effective risk-based 
inspection, maintenance and additional redundancy of control system (He, 2014). 
Moreover, multiple layers of protection could prevent the open hole blowout from 
happening, such as drilling string safety valves. They may fail to close and suffer lock-
up when experiencing high pressure flow. The selection of low-torque drilling string 
safety valve under certain operating conditions could help reduce the failure rate and, 
therefore, decrease the likelihood of open hole blowouts (Stephens, 1998). 
A sensitivity study is conducted to determine how to allocate limited resources to 
prioritize the barriers that can effectively reduce the likelihood, and thus, the blowout 
risk. Figure 50 shows how the total blowout risk is reduced when the probabilities of 
long blowout duration, BOP complete failure, or open hole blowouts are decreased from 
base case to zero. As can be seen, the reduction of BOP complete failure probability 
could decrease the risk up to 68%, while efforts to avoid open hole blowout only 
contribute 3% of risk reduction. Consequently, operators should pay more attention to 
the barriers that could prevent BOP complete failure and reduce the blowout duration to 
manage the blowout risk in this case. 
Mitigating the serious consequences of top risk contributors could also lower the 
total blowout risk. As can be seen in Table 15, most of the top risk scenarios are 
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associated with 100% BOP opening fraction. A proper risk-based inspection and 
maintenance program of the BOP system could not only reduce the likelihood of the 
complete failure scenario but also mitigate the scale of the failure consequence (i.e., less 
than 100% BOP opening fraction under the worst failure scenario). Figure 51 shows the 
relationship between the total blowout risk and the BOP opening fraction of the worst 
failure case. Unlike the probability reduction case, a non-linear relationship is 
demonstrated. Given the typical non-linear curve for the cost versus the risk, this non-
linear relationship at the benefit side emphasizes the necessity of a cost-benefit analysis. 
As can be seen, when the BOP opening fraction is reduced by 95% (5% opening 
fraction), the total risk decreases by 73%. 
 
 
Figure 50. Example of risk reduction due to likelihood mitigation 
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Figure 51. Example of risk reduction due to consequence mitigation 
 
4.2.4 Discussion 
The primary goal of the proposed methodology is to integrate the well blowout 
simulation modeling with other functionalities to achieve the risk-based operational 
excellence. It is envisioned that this concept, if fully developed, would be applicable 
throughout the entire lifecycle of well operations (drilling, completions, intervention and 
abandonment). This risk-based blowout risk assessment method can be practiced as a 
part of well planning. The well engineer will create the well schematic which will 
identify the flow paths and proposed barriers to be installed. The well schematic and 
well information determined by the engineers could then be imported into the modeling 
as input parameters to evaluate the blowout risk. Engineers could easily switch between 
multiple well designs until an optimum well design has been established. This optimum 
shall be based on considerations of operational efficiency, acceptable risk levels based 
on blowout probability profile, and cost. A log of all the well design simulations could 
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be stored in the database and easy comparative reports could be generated for 
discussions or management approvals. Such reports could also be the furnished to 
regulatory well permit approving body to showcase decision rationale for selecting a 
particular well design.  
In addition, this method to determine the blowout risk could be implemented in 
to the barrier management. This would require the operations team to generate a bowtie 
specific to the operation being planned to identify threats, hazards, and prevention and 
mitigation barriers, as shown in Figure 52. For each barrier identified, barrier 
requirements would be established as defined in regulations, such as NORSOK D-010 or 
API RP 96. Also barrier assurance parameters could be defined which would be 
monitored during the well operations to establish barrier assurance levels. This exercise 
would be similar to performance standards workshop and could be easily done in a 
workshop setting. All the results of the workshop including performance standards and 
bowties would reside in the database. Most organizations have already identified and 
created enterprise level Major Incident Hazards (MAHs) bowties; these could be easily 
imported into this tool and serve as the starting point for this exercise. 
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Figure 52. MAH Bowtie (simplified for purpose of this dissertation) 
 
Moreover, the proposed practice could also be dynamically updated, such as 
potential flow paths and the current status of barriers, as the drilling operation continues 
in the field. Most updated reservoir information would be automatically obtained via the 
downhole logging tools and fed into the blowout simulation model to depict an updated 
and more accurate blowout risk picture. Similarly barrier information would be 
frequently fed into the database via the well reports, inspections, testing, and the rig 
systems. Based on results of the information, a risk profile could be generated for the 
specific operations. Any deviation from the accepted risk profile would require the 
intervention from the appropriate personnel or parties. This would make the operations 
take a more proactive and a focused approach to risk management rather than a reactive 
one as personnel in remote office have information on most probable blowout flow path 
(probability percentage), current barrier status and also the ability to detect effect on 
other systems (barrier link to other MAH bowties). 
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Another benefit of the proposed method is that it can facilitate the analysis of the 
relationships amongst well economics, cost information, and safety performance. 
Operators can input the specific cost information of the barriers and evaluate the 
multiple barriers requirement for a certain flow path; or a comparison of similar type of 
barriers available from different vendors. The barrier reliability data provided by the 
vendor to the operator based on history of use or testing could be utilized to aid this 
decision making. Figure 53 showcases a simplified case of how the cost-benefit analysis 
for safety barrier (i.e., isolation packers or centralizer) selection is performed. Three 
similar barriers (Barrier 1A, 1B and 1C), which could reduce the likelihood of the open 
hole blowout events, are available for procurement from three different vendors (A, B 
and C). The risk reduction percentage is established based on each of the barriers’ 
reliability information (e.g., probability of failure on demand) and the technology 
adopted along with the overall cost during the installation and maintenance. A risk-based 
decision for the selection between Barrier 1A, 1B and 1C therefore can be made. The 
figure shows that Barrier 1B is a cost-effective option over Barrier 1C since the overall 
risk reduction is similar to Barrier 1C but the cost savings is on the scale of USD 
250,000. The rationale behind such a higher cost for Barrier 1C could be based on the 
assumption that it is a newer technology or a newly developed product from vendor C, 
and hence, is being sold at a premium price. The selection of Barrier 1B rather than1A is 
based on the relatively small cost difference between two products but a much better 
overall risk reduction level.  It is important to note that this example only serves as a 
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simplified one; real field applications require consideration of other factors, such as the 
compatibility with other barriers. 
 
 
Figure 53. Example of risk base barrier selection 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 In this section, both consequence-based and risk-based approaches are discussed. 
The application of such approaches is demonstrated by the case study. The consequence-
based approach is easier to be implemented and provide guidance to the operators based 
on the realistic worst-case scenario. It would be useful in the drilling site location 
selection and preparation of emergency response plan. On the other hand, the risk-based 
approach enables the operators to have a comprehensive understanding of the particular 
well that they are working on, so that the risk associated with the blowout events can be 
effectively managed and controlled. It should be noted that the application of the risk-
based approach requires the input from onsite personnel to depict a more accurate risk 
picture.   
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
A fully integrated analytical model that couples the reservoir and wellbore has 
been proposed to investigate the fluid behaviors during the blowout events. This model 
could be used to simulate any potential blowout events for gas, oil, or oil/gas wells at 
onshore or offshore facilities. 
The material balance is considered in the oil reservoir model to obtain the 
dynamic average reservoir pressure. Additional PVT relationship of the gas needs to be 
considered for the gas reservoir. The fluid dynamics and heat transfer are taken into 
account to calculate the pressure drop when the fluid flows along the wellbore. The 
particular concern for gas wells is the potential existence of sonic velocity at the 
wellhead. The determination of sonic velocity requires a proper energy balance to be 
established as the sonic velocity is temperature dependent. For oil wells, the multi-phase 
flow may exhibit various flow patterns in the wellbore depending on the local pressure, 
temperature, and the fluid properties. The reservoir and wellbore interaction is an 
important factor to determine the blowout rate. Analytical equations are used to capture 
the relationship between reservoir pressure and wellbore bottomhole pressure during the 
transient period and pseudo steady-state period. All the physical models are combined 
together to obtain the dynamic blowout rate and total amount of discharge during the 
blowout events. 
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Field examples are presented in this dissertation to validate the onshore and 
offshore gas well blowout model and offshore oil well blowout. The results show that 
the proposed model shows a good agreement with the field examples, existing studies, 
and commercial software. The advantage of this model is to avoid using separate tools to 
simulate the reservoir and wellbore fluid, which may fail to capture the important 
interaction between reservoir and wellbore. Design of experiments is adopted to 
demonstrate the important uncertainties that could affect the blowout behaviors. It could 
be concluded that the blowout rate is strongly sensitive to the change of permeability and 
the reservoir pore-volume connected to the well. 
The results of the simulation can serve as the basis for a series of study. In this 
dissertation, the model is imbedded into consequence-based and risk-based assessment 
tools so that the effectiveness of prevention and mitigation measurements could be 
quantitatively evaluated. The consequence-based assessment couples the blowout model 
and dispersion model to demonstrate the area which could under effect of the potential 
blowout events due to toxic gas dispersion, explosion, and fires. This assessment 
provides a more realistic blowout scenario compared to the WCD required in the US 
Gulf of Mexico region. A proper emergency response plan, toxic/flammable gas sensor 
placement, and drilling site selection could benefit from the consequence-based 
assessment.  
The risk-based assessment, on the other hand, presents a more comprehensive 
risk picture associate with the potential blowout events. The uncertainties from generic 
historical database, such as the blowout duration and flow paths, are considered here. In 
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addition, some well-specific parameters distribution, including permeability and 
porosity, are combined with uncertainties obtained from historical databases to create a 
spectrum of potential blowout scenarios. Each scenario is associated with a unique 
probability and consequence. Coupling the probability and consequence together, the 
well-specific blowout risk could be fully assessed. 
The results of the risk-based assessment have a variety of applications. The 
effectiveness and values of both prevention and mitigation barriers could be evaluated in 
terms of the risk reduction fraction. It can also help to allocate the limited resources to 
important barriers to improve the safety performance. In addition, cost-benefit analysis 
can acquire valuable information from this risk-based approach to aid the decision 
making process. 
In general, the work presented here shows a promising approach for conducting a 
detailed study to the consequence and risk associated with the blowout events during 
different operational phases. By considering the physics in the reservoir, wellbore, and 
their interactions, the consequence model can readily couple with the uncertainties 
obtained from historical database and well-specific testing data to illustrate the full 
picture of blowout risk. Sensitivity analysis can provide guidance for the determination 
of the effectiveness of prevention and mitigation barriers. Moreover, the analysis from 
this work can serve as an engineering benchmark in the assessment of blowout risk and 
the development of the risk reduction plan. 
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5.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
 This research proposed a consequence modeling to simulate the blowout events, 
based on which the consequence-based and risk-based assessments to blowout risk were 
developed. The occurrence of blowout events indicates the failure of the primary barrier 
– drilling mud. Therefore, no probability of failure of the primary barrier is considered in 
this research. The failure of the primary barrier should be taken into account when 
evaluating the risk associated with the kick events which are considered as the leading 
indicator of blowout events. Physical model is required to determine the consequence of 
kick events and historical database could provide their likelihood. Combining the 
consequence and likelihood of kick events leads to a risk model that could be 
implemented into the blowout risk assessment approach in this research to evaluate the 
risks of both kick and blowout events. 
 In addition, this research assumes when BOP fails to function, it is either 
partially closed (5% opening) or fully opened (100% opening). The probability 
distribution is based on the suggestion from the industry guidelines. A BOP reliability 
model and BOP failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) need to be investigated to 
further determine such probability distribution so that more realistic blowout risk results 
can be obtained. Moreover, human failure, which has been responsible for over 70% of 
the causes in offshore incidents, could be taken into account (Reason, 1997). At present, 
a number of studies have addressed the effect of human factors in the onshore and 
offshore operations. Such investigation could be integrated into the current model to 
reflect the effect of human behaviors to the blowout risk. 
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 In this research, we assumed the blowout rate reaches the maximum value 
immediately after the occurrence of blowout. In reality, the blowout rate will increase to 
the maximum value and then decline. Such increase of the rate in the beginning of the 
blowout event would take several minutes. This short time period can be neglected when 
the blowout lasts for days. Moreover, as shown in Chapter IV, the blowout scenarios 
with short blowout duration belongs to the high likelihood and low consequence 
category and is not as significant as the scenarios with long blowout duration. However, 
when simulating blowouts with short duration or kick events, the early period where the 
blowout rate increase occurs will become significant for the prediction of total discharge 
amount during the blowout event. A fully transient wellbore fluid model will be required 
to address the blowout rate increase in early period.  
 In this research, the consequence modeling of blowout events is applied to the 
risk assessment with regard to the environmental impact. Other studies could also utilize 
the results of such models. For example, the blowout rate could serve as an important 
input for the oil plume and drift modeling. The oil composition, weather condition, and 
marine environment are also coupled together for a better oil spill preparedness and 
response plan. The impact due to the blowout to the personnel and equipment on the 
offshore facilities can be evaluated based on the consequence models presented here. 
Blowout is one of the important considerations for the design of fire and blast walls and 
facility siting at the platform against incidental loads. Currently, one design of incidental 
loads is based on the effect of the fire and explosion due to blowout events in which the 
blowout rate, several times higher than the normal production rate, is assumed to be 
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constant. The approach proposed here can provide either a consequence-based or a risk-
based basis for a better design and construction for the offshore facilities. 
 The primary goal of this research is to develop a blowout risk assessment tool 
which can be used by not only the engineers but also the onsite operators. This tool 
could dynamically update the risk associated with any operations, including drilling, 
completion, intervention and production. The safety performance of each prevention and 
mitigation barriers is considered in this tool. The human factor and kick events can also 
integrated into the assessment to enable operators to ensure a safe and sound operational 
environment. 
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APPENDIX A  
CORRELATIONS OF OIL/GAS PROPERTIES 
Experimentally, all the properties of crude oil and gas can be obtained in a 
laboratory. Based on the experimental results, different curves are generated for use in 
the field. However, different gas volume fractions in gas/oil mixtures complicate the 
application of such curves. In addition, they cannot aid the computational simulation due 
to implementation issues. In the absence of experimental data of properties of the 
reservoir fluid, it is necessary to determine the properties from empirical correlations. 
Therefore, a number of researchers developed a wide variety of correlations for the 
properties of oil/gas mixtures. In this chapter, the correlations that are used in this work 
are shown. 
A.1 Compressibility Factor 
The compressibility factor is one of the most important parameters for the PVT 
relationship of gas. It is a non-linear function of reduced pressure and reduced 
temperature, which results in the difficulties during implementation into computational 
program. In this research, a reduced density is introduced (Dranchuk, 1975): 
 0 rr
r
Z P
ZT
    (97) 
where 
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and 0Z  is assumed to be 0.270. Then Equation (97) becomes: 
 0( ) 0r r rf ZT Z P      (99) 
 The constants in Equation (98) are listed in the table below. Then the iterative 
Newton Raphson Method is adopted with an initial guess of 1Z   to get convergence of 
r  as shown in Equation (100). The converged value of r  is plugged into Equation 
(98) to get the value of the compressibility factor. 
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Table 16. Constants value in Equation (98) 
Constant Value 
 1A  0.3265 
2A  -1.0700 
3A  0.5339 
4A  0.01569 
5A  -0.05165 
6A  0.5475 
7A  -0.7361 
8A  0.1844 
9A  0.1056 
10A  0.6134 
11A  0.7210 
 
A.2 Bubble Point Pressure 
Bubble point describes the conditions of temperature and pressure at which the 
first bubble of gas comes out of the liquid oil/gas mixture. In the reservoir, the 
temperature is considered as a constant. Bubble point pressure is the criteria of phase 
separation phenomenon in the reservoir. The Vasquez-Beggs Correlation (Vasquez, 
1980) is used in this work: 
 148 
 
 2
1/
1 3
[ ]
exp( / ( 460))
Csb
b
gs
R
p
C C API T


  (101) 
where sbR  is the gas solubility at the bubble point pressure and reservoir temperature, 
gs  is the specific gravity of gas measured at the separator, and T  is reservoir 
temperature in  F. gs  can be obtained from a separator pressure of 100 psig because it 
represents the average field separator conditions. The following equation could adjust g  
at any separator condition to the referenced separator conditions:  
 
5[1 5.912(10 )( ) log( )]
114.7
sep
gs g sep
p
API T       (102) 
If the separator conditions are unknown, the unadjusted gas gravity may also be used. 
The coefficients 1C , 2C , and 3C  are shown in the following table: 
 
Table 17. Values of the coefficients used in Equation (101) 
Coefficient API   30 API > 30 
1C  0.0362 0.0178 
2C  1.0937 1.1870 
3C  25.7240 23.9310 
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A.3 Gas Solubility 
The gas solubility sR  is defined as the amount of gas in standard cubic feet that 
can dissolve in one stock-tank barrel of crude oil at a specified pressure and temperature. 
It is a strong function of the pressure, temperature, oil gravity, and gas gravity. The gas 
solubility increases with an increase of pressure at constant temperature until the gas 
solubility reaches its maximum value. Figure 54 shows a typical gas solubility curve as a 
function of pressure for undersaturated oil. The gas solubility remains constant if the 
reservoir pressure is higher than bubble point pressure, and decreases if the reservoir 
pressure drops below bubble point pressure. 
Vasques and Beggs (Vasquez, 1980) proposed an empirical correlation of sR  
based on 5,008 experimental data points. The measured data was divided into two 
groups depending on the oil gravity. The expression of the proposed correlation is: 
 21 exp[ / ( 460)]
C
gsRs C p API T    (103) 
where the coefficients 
1C , 2C , and 3C are the same as the equation used to calculate the 
bubble point pressure. 
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Figure 54. Gas solubility pressure diagram  
 
A.4 Oil Formation Volume Factor 
The oil formation volume factor 
oB  is defined as the ratio of the volume of oil at 
reservoir conditions to the volume of oil at standard conditions. The mathematical 
expression of 
oB  is given by: 
 
,( )
( )
o p T
o
o sc
V
B
V
   (104) 
A typical oil formation factor curve is a function of pressure at constant 
temperature as shown in Figure 55. If the pressure is above the bubble point pressure, the 
decrease in pressure results in an increase in oil formation volume factor because of the 
oil expansion. When the pressure is less than bubble point pressure, the oil formation 
volume factor will decrease with the pressure going down owing to the gas liberation. 
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Vasquez and Beggs (Vasquez, 1980) used 6,000 measurements of 
oB  at different 
pressures to propose a correlation: 
 
1 2 31.0 ( 60)( )[ ]o s s
gs
API
B C R T C C R

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  (105) 
for 
bp p , and 
 0
exp[ ( )]o ob bB B c p p     (106) 
for 
bp p , 0c  is given by:  
 0 5
1433 5 17.2 1180 12.61
10
s gsR T API
c
p
    
   (107) 
where 
sR  is the value at the bubble point pressure and reservoir temperature, gs  is the 
specific gravity of gas measured at the separator, and T  is reservoir temperature in   F. 
0c  is also the regression of isothermal compressibility. The coefficients 1C , 2C , and 3C  
are shown in the following table: 
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Table 18. Values of the coefficients used in Equation (105) 
Coefficient API   30 API > 30 
1C  
44.677 10  
44.670 10  
2C  
51.751 10  
51.100 10  
3C  
81.811 10   
91.337 10  
 
 
Figure 55. Oil formation volume factor pressure diagram  
 
A.5 Viscosity 
The viscosity of crude oil is an important physical property since it governs the 
flow through porous media and pipes. It is usually considered an internal resistance of 
fluid flow. When lacking laboratory measurements, some correlations of oil viscosity 
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may be used. Beggs and Robinson (1975) proposed an empirical equation based on 
2,073 observations of saturated oil viscosity. The expression is given by: 
 ( )
b
oda    (108) 
where 
 
0.51510.715( 100)sa R
    (109) 
 
0.3385.44( 150)sb R
    (110) 
od  in Equation (108) is the viscosity of dead oil that is defined as the viscosity 
of crude oil with no gas in the solution at atmospheric pressure. Beggs and Robinson 
(Beggs, 1975) also proposed the correlation of 
od  after analyzing 460 dead oil viscosity 
data points as follows: 
 10 1
X
od     (111) 
where 
 1.163( 460)X Y T     (112)
  
 10ZY    (113) 
 3.0324 0.02023Z API    (114) 
For undersaturated oil, the Vasquez-Beggs correlation is used in this work. The 
viscosity at pressures above the bubble point pressure is a function of viscosity at bubble 
point pressure, 
ob , pressure, p , and bubble point pressure, bp : 
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p
    (115) 
where 
 1.187 52.6 exp( 11.514 8.98 10 )m p p      (116) 
When bp p , Equation (115) is equivalent to Equation (108). 
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APPENDIX B  
NOMENCLATURE 
 
an series roots of Equation (71) 
B oil formation volume factor, bbl/STB 
Bg current gas formation volume factor, rcf/scf 
Bgi initial gas formation volume factor, rcf/scf 
c sonic velocity of gas, ft/sec 
CJ Joule-Thomson coefficient, ºF/psi 
<C> average concentration in plume, ppm 
cp heat capacity, Btu/(lbm-ºF) 
ct total compressibility, psi-1 
D non-Darcy flow coefficient, D/Mscf 
d pipe diameter, ft 
ETNT energy of explosion of TNT, 2016 Btu/lbm 
f Moody friction factor, dimensionless 
fg gas volume fraction, fraction 
g acceleration owing to gravity, ft/sec2 
G current gas-in-place, Mscf 
gc conversion factor, 32.17 (lbm-ft)/(lbf-sec2) 
gG geothermal gradient, ºF/ft 
Gi initial gas-in-place, Mscf 
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Gp cumulative production, Mscf 
Gr Grashof number, dimensionless 
h net pay, ft 
hc annular fluid convective heat transfer coefficient, Btu/(hr•ft2• ºF) 
hto tubing fluid convective heat transfer coefficient, Btu/(hr•ft2• ºF) 
J mechanical equivalent heat, 778 (ft-lbf)/Btu 
J1 Bessel functions of the first kind 
k permeability, md 
K eddy diffusivity, ft2/sec 
ke reservoir heat conductivity, Btu/(hr•ft• ºF) 
L well depth, ft 
LR relaxation distance parameter, 1/ft 
m mass of hydrocarbon, lbm 
M molecular weight, lbm/lb-mol 
m(p) pseudopressure, psia2/cp 
mTNT equivalent mass of TNT, lbm 
n number of moles, mol 
Nu Nusselt number, dimensionless 
p  average reservoir pressure, psia 
pa ambient pressure, psig 
pi initial reservoir pressure, psia 
po peak side-on overpressure, psig 
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Pr Prandtl number, dimensionless 
pwf flowing bottomhole pressure, psia 
q fluid flow rate at standard conditions, Mscf/D 
Q heat flow rate, Btu/(lbm• ºF) 
Qm gas mass flow rate, lbm/D 
r distance from the ground-zero point of explosion, ft 
R universal gas constant 
rci casing inner radius, ft 
rco casing outer radius, ft 
re reservoir drainage radius, ft 
Re Reynolds number, dimensionless 
reD dimensionless reservoir drainage radius with respect to wellbore  
 radius, dimensionless 
rinv radius of investigation, ft 
rti tubing inner radius, ft 
rto tubing outer radius, ft 
rw wellbore radius, ft 
s mechanical skin, dimensionless 
sg gas saturation, fraction 
t blowout duration, hr 
T temperature, ºF 
tDw dimensionless time 
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Te reservoir temperature, ºF 
Tei formation temperature at initial condition, ºF 
Teibh initial bottomhole temperature, ºF 
Tf fluid temperature, ºF 
v fluid velocity, ft/sec 
v∞ terminal rise velocity, ft/s 
Ve volume of reservoir, ft3 
vg in-site gas velocity, ft/s 
vm mixture velocity, ft/s 
vsg velocity of gas, ft/s 
vsL superficial liquid velocity, ft/s 
Y1 Bessel functions of the second kind 
Z gas compressibility factor, dimensionless 
ze scaled distance, ft/lbm1/3 
Zi initial gas compressibility factor, dimensionless 
zw variable well depth from surface, ft 
α wellbore inclination with horizontal, degrees 
γ heat capacity ration, dimensionless 
ΔHc energy of explosion of the flammable gas, Btu/lbm 
ϵ pipe roughness, 1/ft 
η empirical explosion efficiency, dimensionless 
μ viscosity, cp 
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ρg gas density, lbm/ft3 
ρL liquid density, lbm/ft3 
σ surface tension, lbm/s2 
ϕ porosity, fraction 
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B.1 Abbreviation 
 
API American Petroleum Institute 
BOEMRE Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and  
 Enforcement 
BOP Blowout preventer 
BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
DOCD Development and Coordination Document 
DOI Department of Interior 
DOJ Department of Justice 
DPP Development of Production Plan 
EP Exploration Plan 
ERCB Energy Resource Conservation Board 
GOM Gulf of Mexico 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
IPR Inflow Performance cure 
JT Joule-Thomson Effect 
KE Kinetic energy 
MAH Major Incident Hazard 
MMS Minerals Management Service 
MOC Management of Change 
NAF Neal Adams Firefighters 
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OCS Outer Continental Shelf 
OGP International Association of Oil & Gas Producers 
RP Recommended Practice 
TPC Tubing performance curve 
WCD Worst-Case Discharge 
WOAD World Offshore Incident Databank 
